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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Technology Adoption, Demographics, and Development by
Ting-Wei Lai
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Ping Wang, Chair
Professor B. Ravikumar, Co-Chair
This dissertation is to connect empirical ndings with grounded theoretical analysis on two economic
issues. One of the studies investigates industrial productivity by tting in a theoretical model with quanti-
tative methods. In addition, I explore how a demographic policy in China brings forth a profound impact
in all aspects of the fast-growing economy.
The rst chapter, \Casual Labor, Uncertainty, and Technology Adoption in Agriculture," examines why
both the technology adoption rate and labor productivity in agriculture are low in the context of developing
countries. A two-stage model is built to explain how the availability of casual (non-permanent) labor ex-post,
in the presence of uncertainty may aect agents' ex-ante technology choices. A higher degree of uncertainty
induces the agents to choose traditional production technology that relies heavily on the labor input instead
of using any modern intermediate inputs. By calibrating the model to t the micro data in Tanzania, I
show that this proposed framework can be used to account for two targets of interest: low aggregate labor
productivity and the low technology adoption rate. Counterfactual exercises suggest that the severity of
uncertainty before the harvest stage and the abundance of casual labor are the potential drivers for the two
targets to be explained.
viii
The second chapter, \Growth in a Patrilocal Economy: Female Schooling, Household Savings, and China's
One-Child Policy," is co-authored Wei-Cheng Chen. We develop a model of parental education decision to
analyze how a population control policy aects saving and schooling in a patrilocal society, where sons are
responsible to support aged parents more than daughters. Parent's investment in education depends on the
degree of parental altruism and the need for old-age security. A tightened population control policy makes
parental altruism more important relative to the security motive and shortens gender gap in education. We
also take another crucial intergenerational incentive for daughter's education into account, since lower fertility
promotes female labor market participation and increases the value of female education. Our model explains
why the Chinese economy under the \One-Child Policy" exhibits a rapid growth of relative female schooling.
Moreover, this chapter also articulates the relationship between household savings and demographic changes
based on a general equilibrium analysis, which has been discussed extensively in recent years to explain the
China's saving puzzle.
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Chapter 1
Casual Labor, Uncertainty, and
Technology Adoption in Agriculture
1.1 Introduction
As documented, there is nearly 50% employment involved in agriculture sector in developing countries,
and it is the sector that is characterized by much lower labor productivity and lower technology adoption
rate than rich countries.1 In this chapter, a two-stage model is built to explain how the availability of casual
labor ex-post, which serves as an instrument to hedge against an aggregate productivity shock, leads to the
eect of uncertainty on the agents' ex-ante technology choices. This could be an important cause leading
to low aggregate labor productivity and low technology adoption rate, which are observed from micro data.
In so doing, this chapter can serve to address an essential question raised by Caselli (2005) and Restuccia,
Yang, and Zhu (2008): why are labor productivity gaps in the agriculture sectors between rich and poor
countries so large compared to the non-agricultural sectors. Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014a) also nd
that substantial productivity gaps still exist even though a rened measure of inputs and outputs has been
taken into account.
1The cross-country share of employment is referred to in Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM), 2013.
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There are a number of reasons provided in the literature to explain why the usage of modern intermediate
inputs, mainly tractors, fertilizer, high-yielding varieties and other chemicals, is so low in developing countries
and how the low adoption rate inuences productivity in the agricultural sector.2 Empirical studies, mostly
using survey data from a specic country, attribute the cause of the low adoption rate to the substantial
xed cost associated with poor infrastructure (e.g., Suri 2011), to the lack of insurance or other means to
maintain smoothed consumption (e.g., Dercon and Christiaensen 2011), and to farmers' insucient ability to
learn from their social networks (e.g., Conley and Udry 2010). Even though evidence from eld experiments
by Duo, Kremer, and Robinson (2011) shows that there exists protability when making the investment,
some reasons still impede the ecient use of intermediate inputs: credit constraints, for example. Foster
and Rosenzweig (2010) identify determinants which are correlated with the probability of adopting modern
intermediate inputs: education, the risks associated with a lack of insurance, the expected rate of return,
and so forth.
In this chapter, I study how uncertainty will aect the agents' ex-ante decisions regarding the use of
intermediate inputs if a part of the production inputs are exible and allowed to be adjusted ex-post. I show
that the availability to adjust the optimal employment ex-post will push up farmers' sunk investments in
these inputs ex-ante when uncertainty rises because their expected marginal product thereby increases (the
positive intensive-margin eect). Meanwhile, the rise in uncertainty will make agents reluctant to adopt
modern technology (the negative extensive-margin eect), and therefore which of these competing eects
dominates is therefore a quantitative issue of interest to be subsequently assessed.
This chapter is the rst to study how the missing but potentially important channel, the availability of
casual labor, causes the impact of uncertainty on agents' ex-ante technology choices, and to quantitatively
2Please refer to Alston and Pardey (2014), for example.
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evaluate the eect by using a formalized model. I present stylized facts by using aggregate data from multiple
countries to show how casual labor accounts for a large proportion of labor force, especially in agriculture.
The motivations are primarily based on Rosenzweig (1988) and Behrman (1999), who document that casual
labor has always coexisted with its counterpart, permanent labor, in rural areas of developing countries. The
main dierence between the two groups is that the casual labor is employed temporarily or on a daily basis,
whereas its counterpart is hired for multiple periods at a xed wage rate.3 In order to model the feature
of labor markets, a staged production process with a productivity shock is thereby introduced.4 A recent
empirical study by Rosenzweig and Udry (2014) nd that a bad rainfall shock will result in a decline in wage
for labor at the harvest stage in India. Their ndings show that local labor demand is state-dependent and
conditional on the realized rainfall outcome whereas labor supply is limited.
In this chapter, the expected costs of hiring labor ex-post is endogenized in a generalized framework in
order to take the probability of matching with respect to dierent realized states into account. The concern
is that the costs of obtaining labor on time, in addition to their regular wages, are probably low if labor
supply is unlimited at any time in developing countries, as argued by Lewis (1954).5 The household-level
data to be used shows that the demand for such hired labor, in terms of a variety of production works, could
be strong in the agricultural sector. Another motivating piece of evidence observed by Gollin, Lagakos, and
Waugh (2014b) is that a high percentage of labor involved in part-time activities arises due to the need to
smooth out seasonal uctuations in agricultural labor demand. Hence, to account for these stylized facts
regarding the uctuations in hired labor over time and across regions, a model with planting-to-harvest
3The term \casual labor," based on a general denition in most ocial publications, refers to labor that receives wages
according to daily-based or periodic contracts. It is supposed to be consistent with an alternative classication, hired labor, to
be usually observed from micro data as long as the labor is paid daily wages.
4The reason, as argued by Newbery (1977), is that agricultural production actually involves a sequence of decisions and
they are made under the eects of unforeseen events, like unexpected weather conditions.
5The possibility of shortages of hired labor in the U.S. farm labor market, for example, is documented by Fisher and Knutson
(2013). One of the reasons that leads to a shortage is a lack of farm workers that are available to \harvest a farmer's crop when
it is ready."
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staged agricultural production is constructed in this chapter to explain the interactive relationship between
inputs at dierent production stages.
The analytical approach of this chapter is related to a growing literature that examines industrial de-
velopment by using micro survey data and applying quantitative analysis; e.g., Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014b), among others. This chapter is also close to studies that investigate
how some potential distortionary factors account for productivity dierences across countries; e.g., barriers
to consuming modern intermediate inputs and barriers associated with the labor market by Restuccia, Yang,
and Zhu (2008), transportation cost frictions by Adamopoulos (2011), policies leading to diminishing farm
size by Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014a), and uninsurable risks owing to the incomplete market by Dono-
van (2014), among others. Moreover, in a way that is dierent from the explanation of external distortions,
a self-selection eect argued by Lagakos and Waugh (2013) acts as a complement to other explanations,
which amplies productivity dierences across countries.
In this chapter, an analytical framework to evaluate the role of uncertainty is built but diers from the
existing literature in that I try to explore its eect on agents' production decisions. In particular, I focus on
how casual labor demand comes from the need to adjust production inputs ex-post and how the availability
changes farmers' ex-ante choices of optimal technology. The framework facilitates quantitative work and
the results are reconciled with the main ndings based on agents' decisions, including the adoption rate
of modern technology, the permanent-casual labor ratio, and labor productivity. Based on the proposed
framework, counterfactual exercises suggest that the severity of uncertainty before the harvest stage and the
abundance of casual labor are the potential drivers of the low adoption rate and low productivity.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Data sources regarding cross-country labor surveys and
household-level surveys are briey described in Section 1.2. The main descriptive statistics and stylized facts
4
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Figure 1.1: Cross-country GDP per capita vs casual/seasonal/temporary worker ratio in the rural sector
around year 2010 (14 Africa countries and India)
are also provided. In Section 1.3, I build a two-stage model to analyze the factors that inuences adoption
rate of modern technology. Section 1.4 presents the comparative statics analysis in detail in regard to how
a change in the degree of uncertainty aects agents' ex-ante decisions. Section 1.5 presents how the model
is calibrated to match the micro data and how quantitative exercises proceed. Section 1.6 provides some
concluding remarks.
1.2 Evidence from macro and micro survey data
The data used in this chapter are obtained from two sources: the aggregate data from the cross-country
labor force survey and the micro data from the Living Standard Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on
Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). Based on aggregate data from ocial employment reports, it is observed that hired
casual labor accounts for a large proportion of employment across countries especially in the agricultural
sector. The general pattern is summarized in [Figure 1.1], in which the negative slope delivers the fact that
there is substantially higher share of casual labor in the rural/agricultural sector in developing countries;
5
e.g., India and Tanzania.6
The number of hired farm workers in the U.S. is documented in various issues of quarterly reports
provided by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). [Figure 1.16] illustrates the uctuations in
the numbers of such workers to be hired over time. Workers are divided into three categories in terms of the
duration of time they are expected to be employed and the type of contract signed. The series, especially the
number of workers to be hired on a short-term basis, exhibits a strong seasonality, and the peaks of labor
demand consistently occur in the middle of each year, around the time of the harvest. In addition to the
dimension of time, the demand is also contingent on regional dierences, or else is dictated by local weather
conditions (Fisher and Knutson, 2013). Hence, local shortages and surpluses of hired farm labor may exist
nationwide at the same time.
Ocial and long-term statistics are limited but still available from some developing countries. For
example, in India casual labor in rural areas accounts for almost twice the total employment in urban areas.
[Table 1.1] is constructed based on various issues of Key Indicators of Employment and Unemployment
in India and related ocial reports released by the National Sample Survey Oce (NSSO) of India. The
table summarizes the statistics regarding the labor share based on dierent types of employment status
and the corresponding daily wage in rural and urban sectors of India in recent years. Employed persons
are categorized into three broadly-dened groups: self-employed, regularly salaried, and casual labor. As
shown in [Table 1.1], the share of casual labor is about 33%{39%, which is substantially higher in the rural
sector than the share for those regularly salaried. By contrast, the share of labor accounted for by casual
labor is much smaller in the urban sector. The evidence suggests that hiring casual labor is common in the
agricultural sector since agriculture is the primary economic activity in rural areas.7
6The statistics of fourteen Africa countries is obtained from Decent Work Indicators in Africa - A rst assessment based
on national sources, which is published by International Labour Organization.
7It dominantly accounts for 64.1% of aggregate rural employment in India in the year 2011, for example.
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The casual-labor shares in both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of Tanzania are reported in
[Table 2], and the ocial data deliver a summary of the distribution in terms of the workers' employment
status. It is shown that the casual-labor ratio is about 35%{74% in the agricultural sector, and that the
ratio has uctuated a lot over the years. To account for a potential miscounting problem regarding the labor
actually involved in agricultural production as argued by Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014a, b), I seek
micro evidence from the LSMS-ISA. The data are compiled by the development research group of the World
Bank and are favorable to cross-country analysis since the questionnaires are designed on a comparable
basis. The composite surveys by the LSMS-ISA project are composed of three parts, namely, household,
agriculture, and community surveys, and information related to households and their agricultural production
is provided. Tanzania is selected to be the country of study since it is one of the countries for which there
is an available panel for multiple years. Moreover, compared to other countries investigated by the LSMS-
ISA, Tanzania has more detailed information related to hired labor days devoted in both pre-harvest and
post-harvest production works.
The currently available years of integrated survey data for Tanzania are the years 2008{2009 (round 1)
and 2010{2011 (round 2). The total sample size of the second round is 3,924 households, of which 3,168
were visited in the rst round. The basic production unit to be sampled in the agriculture survey is the plot,
and a household may own multiple plots with dierent combinations of inputs and outputs. The number of
plots, and hence the number of observations, in both years exceeds 5,000. The agriculture survey provides
detailed input-output information for each basic production unit, which includes the types of crops cultivated,
the consumption of a variety of intermediate inputs, and the nominal value of output to be harvested. I
rst present descriptive statistics and cross-correlation tables and then relevant gures, shedding light on
empirical ndings worthy of discussion.
7
[Table 3] provides descriptive statistics based on the agriculture survey in Tanzania for both of the
survey years.8 The table shows that only a moderate proportion of plots are fertilized by using chemicals;
or nearly 11%{13% in both years. Over 80% of the plots are owned by households and most of them are
used to cultivate subsistence crops. The use of another crucial intermediate input, pesticide/herbicide, which
is considered to be complementary to chemical fertilizer is also limited. Moreover, most households choose
some specic type of inorganic fertilizer based on their members' personal experiences or advice from experts
and only one percent of them have obtained any seeds, fertilizers, or pesticides/herbicides on credit. Around
30% of them have recorded unexpected losses due to the area harvested being smaller than that planted
during 2010-2011, and the main cause is the weather eect which is documented as unexpected drought
(57.37%) and rain (10.35%). The impact of the unexpected weather conditions could be large because the
region with a higher probability of suering the unexpected losses tends to have a lower adoption rate of
chemicals. [Figure 1.4] rst presents the probability of having losses in years 2008{2009 and 2010{2011 on
left and it suggests a consistent result across years. Then, the gure delivers a signicant negative correlation
between the probability of suering losses in year 2008{2009 and the adoption rate year 2010{2011 on right.
Labor involved in production is grouped into two categories, family and hired (casual) labors, and their
units are measured in days. The regular activities that they are engaged in or assigned are planting,
weeding, fertilizing and harvesting, and the numbers of days on which workers engage in each activity
are also observable for both groups. The hired labor is treated as casual labor in this chapter and this
classication will minimize the possibility of miscounting problems because the labor is hired on a daily
basis for a variety of needs in each production unit, and it is basically consistent with the denition of casual
labor based on the aggregate data. It is observed that 31% and 27% of plots were previously worked on
8The summary statistics of the latest round in year 2012-2013 is also included in Table 3 to help understand the changes of
variables over time. The table is made mainly based on information obtained by merging Tables 1A, 2A, 3A, and 4A from the
agriculture survey of the LSMS-ISA. The variables and the series numbers to which they are referred are listed in the Appendix.
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by hired labor in the years 2008 and 2010.9 I divide the hired labor into two categories based on those
hired ex-ante for planting, weeding and fertilizing, and ex-post for harvesting. [Figure 1.5] indicates that
the reason for hiring labor at the harvest stage is motivated by the need to improve prots derived from
harvested crops in the near future. Each blue (red) point in the gure represents a combination of the labor
input and imputed prots based on the observation that labor was hired (not hired) at the harvest stage.
To account for the scale eect, both variables are divided by the corresponding size of each plot. The gure
shows that, given all predetermined and sunk inputs, the plots with hired labor at this stage tend to have
higher prots per hectare with respect to dierent levels of the labor/land ratio.
The comparison of the last two rows of [Table 3] shows the labor productivity gains as a result of using
chemical fertilizer, and the gains are measured by the value of output per labor day. The gap in terms of the
mean values suggests that the labor productivity is more than doubled from not using any intermediates.
To highlight the dierence, the agents' discrete choices are hence denoted as using traditional and modern
technology hereafter. [Figure 1.6] displays the land and labor productivity sorted from the least to the
most productive production units with respect to the two technologies, and the dierences indicate that the
aggregate productivity level will be signicantly correlated with the choice of modern technology. On the
other hand, a strong correlation between the two productivity measures presented in [Figure 1.7] suggests
that agents with higher labor productivity are aligned with the ones with higher land productivity, and hence
the use of a dierent measure does not substantially change the quantitative results.
Finally, [Table 4] is constructed to show the pair-wise correlations between agents' choices of crucial
intermediate inputs and how the choices are related to labor productivity in both of the survey years. It
is observed that the use of one input is signicantly correlated with the use of another; for example, the
9The hired labor with daily-paid wages is easily observed in the agricultural sector, at least in the countries surveyed by the
LSMS-ISA. For example, the ratios were around 38% in Uganda (2010), 15% in Malawi (2010), and more than 25% in Nigeria
(2010).
9
correlation coecient between two dummies, inorganic fertilizer and pesticide/herbicide, is 0.26{0.27. In
addition, agents who use these intermediate inputs in general have higher labor productivity than those who
do not, conrming the signicance of selecting one farming type compared to the other.
1.3 The model
In this section, a model is constructed to illustrate the staged decisions during the agricultural production
cycle.10 In contrast to the existing literature, an ex-ante technology adoption problem has resulted from the
heterogeneity of agents being taken into account in a generalized model. Two technologies are available for
each agent and there are no barriers or xed costs to choose either one of them.
1.3.1 The setup of the environment
The timeline is displayed in [Figure 1.2]. Each time t is divided into two sub-periods, referred to as the
planting and harvest stages. Agents in the model are risk-neutral farmers with xed populations and are
endowed with heterogenous ability to manage intermediate inputs: e.g., chemical fertilizer, among others.
Workers are divided into two categories, permanent and casual, and they are assumed to be perfectly
substitutable in production. An employed worker will provide a unit of labor in two successive stages if he
serves as a permanent worker or only does so at one of the stages if he is hired as a casual counterpart. In
order to reconcile uctuations in hired labor ratios over time, casual labor is assumed to be hired through
random matching from labor markets.
Diering from the standard competitive market assumption, the matching framework gives rise to a
state-contingent matching probability in equilibrium, which is much lowered as a sharp increase in labor
demand occurs. The rationale is that the additional hiring costs serve as one possible source of labor
10There are some possible applications based on the generalized model; an extension from Rose (2001), for example.
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Figure 1.2: Timeline and agent i's decisions at time t
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market distortions, which conceptually result from how likely labor can be obtained when it is needed at
harvest time. The costs could be dierent across regions or over time because of labor immobility and other
distortionary factors. Hence, without prices to perfectly clear the labor market, the matching probability is
used to capture the costs based on the availability of casual labor at a certain time. Another implication
is that labor demand is likely driven by the local weather eect and the labor market is localized, so that
the matching framework could potentially better explain the large observed uctuations in casual labor over
time or across regions.
The optimization problem that agent i faces at the beginning of the planting period at time t is to
determine a farming technology type, either modern M or traditional T , and then production inputs after-
wards: the quantities of permanent labor nPjt , casual labor n
1j
t and n
2j
t for a j-type farmer for j = M , T ,
as well as the amount of intermediate inputs xt to be consumed only when he chooses to be a modern-type
agent. Accordingly, the production functions of intermediate output by modern-type and traditional-type
agents at the planting stage are respectively g(Bixt; n
PM
t +n
1M
t ) and h(n
PT
t +n
1T
t ), in which Bi is endowed
and individual-specic knowledge or ability to use and manage intermediate inputs. The individual-specic
ability follows a continuous distribution, say, Bi  F (Bi; ) with support in Bi = (0;1). The ability is
augmented for intermediate inputs, and hence only takes eect when choosing modern technology.
An aggregate productivity shock A0t occurs at the beginning/end of the harvest/planting stage. Assume
that the productivity shock follows a uniform distribution, A0t  U(   "=2;  + "=2), and the parameter "
governs the variation of the realized shock around the mean value, or the degree of uncertainty.11 Agents
cannot lay o the permanent labor that was hired from the previous stage no matter how serve the realized
shock is. There is no formal insurance available ex-ante, but after the shock is realized both types of agents
11This assumption is to facilitate the comparative statics. When dealing with computational work, other two-parameter
distributions; e.g., lnN (A; A) or Beta(a; b) can be alternatives to capture the eect from an enlarged degree of uncertainty
while leaving the mean value of A0t unchanged (mean-preserving spreads).
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can hire additional labor, denoted as n2Mt and n
2T
t . On the other hand, the available short-term contracts
for casual labor are assumed to be valid only at the current stage, i.e., either the planting or the harvest one,
and they will expire at the end of the corresponding stage. The land input z is xed and free to be used in
production.
Based on the assumptions, the production of the agricultural good for agent i is either by
FM (A0t; g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t ); n
PM
t + n
2M
t ; z) = A
0
t[g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t )
(nPMt + n
2M
t )
1 ]1 z
or by
FT (A0t; h(n
PT
t + n
1T
t ); n
PT
t + n
2T
t ; z) = A
0
t[h(n
PT
t + n
1T
t )
(nPTt + n
2T
t )
1 ]1 z:
at the end of the harvest stage. The production functions of the intermediate output are further assumed to
be g(Bixt; n
PM
t +n
1M
t ) = (Bixt)
(nPMt +n
1M
t )
1  and h(nPTt +n
1T
t ) = n
PT
t +n
1T
t and remain in the CRTS
form. Final outputs are hence produced by combining land, labor to be hired at each stage, and (optional)
intermediate inputs.
Note that I only focus on the optimization problem for the current period t, even though the framework
can be readily generalized by including dynamics on nPMt or A
0
t across periods, as depicted in [Figure 1.2].
Another extension is to divide t into more than two stages, and study how agents' discrete choices are
observed at each stage; for example, crop choosing, types of seed planting, the use of fertilizer, and irrigation
installation are sequentially aected by uninsured shocks from the future.
1.3.2 Backward solution: decisions at the harvest stage
First, consider the optimization problem for a modern-type agent with Bi and solve it backwards. The
agent determines the extra labor to be hired at the harvest stage after the productivity shock is realized.
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Hence, the additional value generated from hiring labor n2Mt is
JM (Bi; z;A
0
t) = max
v2Mt ; n
2M
t
A0t[g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t )
(nPMt + n
2M
t )
1 ]1 z   2v2Mt   wctn2Mt
s.t. n2Mt = t v
2M
t as A
0
t  ~AM
= 0 as A0t < ~A
M (1.1)
In Eq. (1.1), the amount of intermediate inputs xt and the quantity of permanent labor n
PM
t have been
determined from the previous stage while n2Mt is the quantity of casual labor to be hired at the wage rate
wct upon creating vacancies v
2M
t .
Assume that all agents are hiring labor in the market and that t stands for the probability that a
vacancy is lled in, which is taken as given when the agent optimizes. 2 denotes the additional costs paid
at the harvest stage and hence wct + 2=t is the mean costs of hiring a unit of labor ex-post. The agent will
additionally hire labor if the realized productivity is higher than a threshold ~AM , which is an endogenous
cut-o value that dierentiates good from bad states and is a function of inputs to be determined at the
planting stage.
The optimization problem faced by traditional-type agents is analyzed under the same framework, and
their decision rules are omitted here to avoid redundance. In order to simplify the following analysis, I
assume that the only available short-term contract in the casual labor market is on take-it-or-leave-it basis
and therefore the bargaining condition can be written as
JM (Bi; z;A
0
t)  JM = JM (Bi; z;A0t)  JM + (wct   b)n2Mt
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or
wct = b; (1.2)
where JM equals the value of the modern-type agent from not hiring this unit of casual labor (value from
the outside option), b is disutility from providing a unit of labor in entire period t, and  is the duration of
the harvest stage if time in the whole period t is normalized to be one.
When the realized A0t is larger than threshold values ~A
M and ~AT , the rst-order conditions from modern-
type and traditional-type agents' optimization problems imply that the ratios of labor inputs ex-post to
ex-ante are
nPMt + n
2M
t
nPMt + n
1M
t
=
A0t(1  )(1  )( BixtnPMt +n1Mt )(1 )( znPMt +n1Mt )
b+ 2t(A0t)
 1
+ 
; (1.3)
and
nPMt + n
2T
t
nPTt + n
1T
t
=
A0t(1  )(1  )( znPTt +n1Tt )
b+ 2t(A0t)
 1
+ 
: (1.4)
Note that the matching probability t = t(A
0
t) is contingent on the realized value of A
0
t in equilibrium, and
that both of the ratios positively depend on the realized value of A0t given the assumption that the function
of the hiring costs b+ 2t(A0t)
is concave on A0t. This condition is set to exclude the possibility of a dramatic
rise in marginal costs of hiring labor due to a higher value of A0t, because it may lead to a case of multiple
equilibria and hence make the subsequent analysis more involved.
The endogenous threshold value ~AM is solved by the following condition
@FM (A0t; g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t ); n
PM
t + n
2M
t ; z)
@n2Mt

n2Mt =0
= b+
2
t(A0t)
;
which implies that the agent is indierent between hiring and not hiring an additional unit of labor around
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~AM . Hence, the threshold ~AM is pinned down by
~AM =
b+ 2
t( ~AM )
(1  )(1  )
h Bixt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 ) z
nPMt + n
1M
t
i nPMt
nPMt + n
1M
t
  + 1
; (1.5)
in which the inputs xt, n
PM
t , and n
1M
t are given while the agent is making the decision on hiring labor
ex-post. In addition, the threshold value ~AT from the traditional-type agent's decision can be solved by
~AT =
b+ 2
t( ~AT )
(1  )(1  )
 z
nPTt + n
1T
t
 nPTt
nPTt + n
1T
t
  + 1
: (1.6)
The discrepancy between two threshold values comes from dierent ex-ante input combinations of the two
types of agents, and they may hence make dierent ex-post decisions even when facing the same aggregate
shock. Given the concavity assumption on b+ 2t(A0t)
, Eqs. (1.5) and (1.6) pin down unique solutions of ~AM
and ~AT in turn. Since the endogenous labor ratios and the threshold values rest on pre-determined input
combinations and are functions of related exogenous variables, the analysis based on comparative statics and
the underlying implications are postponed until a more detailed discussion is provided in Section 1.4.
1.3.3 Decisions at the planting stage
As presented in [Figure 1.2], agent i decides a farming technology, M or T , at the beginning of the
planting stage at time t. He then chooses the optimal quantity of permanent and casual labor to be hired
as well as the consumption of intermediate inputs if being a modern-type agent. The wage rate for hiring
a unit of permanent labor is wPt , and the labor is hired through the competitive market without creating
costly vacancies. The rationale is that permanent labor is mostly observed as family labor from the micro
data: it is paid an unobservable wage rate or directly by means of agricultural output and only minimized
costs for matching labor are required. On the other hand, in addition to wages for hiring a unit of casual
labor implied costs 1 are also introduced, making the framework consistent with the optimization problem
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of the harvest stage.
The optimization problem of agent i is therefore outlined as
V (Bi; z) = maxfM;Tg

VM (Bi; z) ; V
T (z)
	
; (1.7)
in which the value functions come from expected prots under two scenarios
VM (Bi; z) = maxfn1Mt ; nPMt ; xtg

  ptxt   wPt nPMt  

(1  )b+ 1
c

n1Mt
+ E
h
FM (A0t; g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t ); n
PM
t + n
2M
t ; z) 

b+
2
t(A0t)

n2Mt
A0t > ~AMi
+ E
h
FM (A0t; g(Bi; n
PM
t + n
1M
t ); n
PM
t ; z)
A0t  ~AMi: (1.8)
and
V T (z) = max
fn1Tt ; nPTt g

  wPt nPTt  

(1  )b+ 1
c

n1Tt
+ E
h
FT (A0t; h(n
PT
t + n
1T
t ); n
PT
t + n
2T
t ; z) 

b+
2
t(A0t)

n2Tt
A0t > ~AT i
+ E
h
FT (A0t; h(n
PT
t + n
1T
t ); n
PT
t ; z)
A0t  ~AT i: (1.9)
The value functions indicate that, given the two endogenous thresholds solved by Eqs. (1.5) and (1.6), the
expected output is a sum of its value under the good state, which will be enlarged because of the adjustment
of the labor input ex-post, and the value under the bad state.
The rst-order condition for choosing xt is
pt
= E
h @
@xt
n
FM (A0t; g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t ); n
PM
t + n
2M
t ; z) 

b+
2
t(A0t)

n2Mt
oA0t > ~AMi
+ E
h @
@xt
FM (A0t; g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t ); n
PM
t ; z)
A0t  ~AMi: (1.10)
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Since the optimal quantity of labor ex-post, nPMt +n
2M
t , is a function of xt based on Eq. (1.3), the availability
to hire additional labor amplies an expected marginal product of xt under the good state. Put dierently,
the argument also implies that the demand for intermediate inputs from a modern-type agent is higher when
casual labor is available than the case in which casual labor is not available under an imposed condition
n2Mt = 0. In addition to the mean-value eect, a change in the uncertainty parameter will inuence the
optimal choice of xt even though the agent is assumed to be risk-neutral. The essence is that n
PM
t + n
2M
t is
also a function of the realized state A0t. Hence, a higher degree of uncertainty implies a higher possibility of
an extreme value of At occurring. This also implies that using intermediate inputs is expected to be more
productive because of an increase in the probability of ex-post adjustment under the good state. The result
is referred to as the intensive-margin eect, and under the condition that casual labor is ex-post available
the degree of uncertainty has a positive impact on the intensity of intermediate inputs relative to the others.
On the other hand, an agent with ability Bi = B, who is previously indierent between the two technology
choices, will depart from modern to traditional technology as the uncertainty level rises. This is because
a larger share of predetermined inputs will make the value of being the modern type increase less than
the alternative, leading to the so-called negative extensive-margin eect. The two competing eects are
derived from the availability of hiring additional labor ex-post, the channel emphasized by this chapter. The
analytical results based on comparative statics and numerical exercises are shown in greater detail in the
following sections. A simplied model by imposing a relatively restricted assumption whereby labor is fully
determined ex-post is considered in the Appendix, and is used to deliver a clear sense of how the channel
gives rise to the two eects. Moreover, it qualitatively shows how a complete adjustment of the labor input
makes the adoption rate or modern technology lower as there is an exogenous increase in the degree of
uncertainty.
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1.3.4 The matching probability in equilibrium
In order to solve the state-contingent equilibrium probability that a vacancy is lled in t(A
0
t), I assume
the matching function in the Cobb-Douglas form M( N;Vt) = m NV 1 t with homogeneity of degree one.
Since the part of the labor force that is available to be casual labor is N in both of the planting and harvest
stages, then the number of matches rests on N as well as the total vacancies created by the modern and
traditional type of agents (with fractions M and 1   M , respectively). Both types of agents will create
vacancies for hiring labor given that A0t  ~Aj for j =M and T , whereas only traditional-type ones do so as
~AT < A0t  ~AM . The equilibrium probability is determined by the matching condition
t =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
m N

(1  M )v2Tt +
R
Bi>B
v2Mt (Bi)dF (Bi)
 
if A0t  ~AM
m N

(1  M )v2Tt
 
if ~AT  A0t < ~AM ;
1 if A0t < ~A
T
(1.11)
where N is the total supply of casual labor and v2Mt = n
2M
t =t and v
2T
t = n
2T
t =t. More precisely, each
t(A
0
t) is pinned down by
t
1  = m
 N
z
(
(1  M )
  (1  )(1  )A0t  znPTt +n1Tt 
b+ 2t
 1
+ 

nPTt + n
1T
t
nPTt

  1
!
nPTt
z
+
Z
Bi>B
  (1  )(1  )A0t  BixtnPMt +n1Mt (1 )  znPMt +n1Mt 
b+ 2t
 1
+ 

nPMt + n
1M
t
nPMt

  1
!
nPMt
z
dF (Bi)
) 
;
(1.12)
as A0t  ~AT , and M 
R
Bi>B
dF (Bi) denotes the fraction of agents who have chosen modern technology
since their individual ability is larger than the threshold value B. [Figure 1.8] shows that there exists a
unique solution of equilibrium probability t = t(A
0
t) in Eq. (1.12) since the left-hand side is an increasing
and concave function of t, whereas the right-hand side, given all other predetermined variables, is decreasing
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in t. The comparative statics is described as
t = t ( A
0
t
( )
;
nPMt
z
(?)
;
nPTt
z
(?)
; 2
(+)
);
and the details are shown in Section 1.4. First, note that an increase in nPMt =z (and n
PT
t =z) will bring
undetermined eects on the equilibrium t. The reasons are that (i) casual labor is perfectly substituted by
the permanent labor, and (ii) the complementarity between intermediate output g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t ) and
total labor ex-post (nPMt + n
2M
t ) is implied by the setting of the production function. The two eects will
respectively lead agents to demand less and more casual labor ex-post, making the matching probability in
equilibrium high and low. Second, a higher realized value of A0t will motivate agents to hire more additional
labor, given that it is larger than ~AM . Last, an exogenous increase in costs 2 will dampen all agents'
incentives to hire labor ex-post, resulting in a higher matching probability in equilibrium.
The matching framework at the planting stage follows the same rule. The more detailed numerical
analysis and comparative statics and provided in the following sections and in the Appendix.
1.4 Comparative statics analysis of the generalized model
How an exogenous change in the degree of uncertainty will aect agents' ex-ante decisions regarding
input combinations is presented in this section. The main concern is that uncertainty will only aect agents'
ex-post decisions indirectly through its eects on these input combinations.
In the generalized model, casual labor is available both before and after a productivity shock A0t is
realized. The technology adoption decision of an agent with ability Bi at the beginning of t is outlined as
V (Bi; z) = maxfM;Tg

VM (Bi; z) ; V
T (z)
	
;
as the two value functions described in Eqs. (1.8) and (1.9). More specically, the value of being a modern-
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type agent can be expressed in detail as
VM (Bi; z) = maxfn1Mt ; nPMt ; xtg

  ptxt   wPt nPMt  

(1  )b+ 1
c

n1Mt
+
Z A
~AM
n
A0t[g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t )]
(1 )(nPMt + n
2M
t )
(1 )(1 )z 

b+
2
t(A0t)

n2Mt
o
dF (A0t)
+
Z ~AM
A
n
A0t[g(Bixt; n
PM
t + n
1M
t ))]
(1 )(nPMt )
(1 )(1 )z
o
dF (A0t)

: (1.13)
The expected costs of hiring a unit of casual labor is contingent on the realized value of A0t whereas the
expected costs ex-ante only rests on its distribution parameters in equilibrium. As mentioned, the endogenous
threshold value ~AM is determined by Eq. (1.5) and it implies that the agent is indierent between hiring
and not hiring the rst unit of labor as A0t = ~A
M .
The quantity of labor to be hired ex-post by the agent as A0t  ~AM , given all other predetermined
production inputs, follows the rst-order condition described by Eq. (1.3). By substituting nPMt + n
2M
t in
terms of a function of nPMt + n
1M
t into Eq. (1.13) and because of the assumption A
0
t  U(  "=2; + "=2),
VM (Bi; z) = maxfn1Mt ; nPMt ; xtg

  ptxt   wPt nPMt   ((1  )b+
1
c
)n1Mt
+
Z +"=2
~AM
n
C(A0t)
1
+  (Bixt)
(1 )
+  (nPMt + n
1M
t )
(1 )(1 )
+  z

+  +

b+
2
t(A0t)

nPMt
o1
"
dA0t
+
Z ~AM
 "=2
n
A0t(Bixt)
(1 )(nPMt + n
1M
t )
(1 )(1 )(nPMt )
(1 )(1 )z
o1
"
dA0t; (1.14)
where the constant
C = (+    )

(1  )(1  )
b+ 2t(A0t)
 (1 )(1 )
+ 
:
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The rst-order conditions for n1Mt , n
PM
t , and xt can be derived in turn by:
(1  )b+ 1
c
=
Z +"=2
~AM

C(1  )(1  )
+     (A
0
t)
1
+ 
h  Bixt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )  z
nPMt + n
1M
t
i 1+ 1
"
dA0t
+
Z ~AM
 "=2

(1  )(1  )A0t
h  Bixt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )  z
nPMt + n
1M
t
i nPMt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )(1 )1
"
dA0t;
(1.15)
wPt
=
Z +"=2
~AM

C(1  )(1  )
+     (A
0
t)
1
+ 
h  Bixt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )  z
nPMt + n
1M
t
i 1+ 
+

b+
2
t(A0t)
1
"
dA0t
+
Z ~AM
 "=2

(1  )(1  )A0t
h  Bixt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )  z
nPMt + n
1M
t
i nPMt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )(1 )
+ (1  )(1  )A0t
h  Bixt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )  z
nPMt + n
1M
t
i nPMt
nPMt + n
1M
t
  +1
"
dA0t;
(1.16)
and nally,
pt
=
Z +"=2
~AM

C (1  )
+     (A
0
t)
1
+ 
nPMt + n1Mt
xt
h  Bixt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )  z
nPMt + n
1M
t
i 1+ 1
"
dA0t
+
Z ~AM
 "=2

(1  )A0t
nPMt + n1Mt
xt
h  Bixt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )  z
nPMt + n
1M
t
i nPMt
nPMt + n
1M
t
(1 )(1 )1
"
dA0t:
(1.17)
Note that the rst-order conditions (15){(17) and endogenous thresholds ~AM and ~AT are related to the en-
dogenous input combinations 1 =
h 
Bixt
nPMt +n
1M
t
(1 )  z
nPMt +n
1M
t
i nPMt
nPMt +n
1M
t
  +
, 2 =
nPMt +n
1M
t
xt
,
and 3=
nPMt
nPMt +n
1M
t
. The latter two ratios are of particular interest: 2 is the inverse of intensity of interme-
diate inputs relative to labor and 3 is the permanent labor share at the planting stage. By rearrangement,
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conditions (3) and (5) can be rewritten as
nPMt
nPMt + n
2M
t
=
 b+ 2t(A0t)
A0t(1  )(1  )
 1
+   1
1
 1
+ 
; (1.18)
and
(1  )(1  )1 ~AM = b+ 2
t( ~AM )
: (1.19)
As shown in [Figure 1.9a] and [Figure 1.10], the two conditions determine the unique threshold value of hiring
any casual labor, ~AM , as well as the permanent-labor ratio ex-post. They also suggest that several factors
are responsible for the higher reliance on casual labor ex-post, one of which is an indirect eect derived from
uncertainty. Given its positive eect on the input combination 1 (to be shown later), Eq. (1.19) and [Figure
1.9b] imply a lower threshold value ~AM to hire labor ex-post when the agent is making decisions ex-ante
and taking a higher degree of uncertainty into account. On the other hand, Eq. (1.18) and [Figure 1.10] also
suggest a lower permanent labor ratio or higher casual labor ratio ex-post.
Using the input combinations dened above, the comparative statics will be conducted by simplifying
Eqs. (1.15){(1.17) respectively as
(1  )b+ 1
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=
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
C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0
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1
"
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
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
1
"
dA0t;
 fM1C(1; 3; "; 2); (1.20)
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and nally
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Note that the three input combinations are jointly determined by Eqs. (1.20), (1.21), and (1.23), and hence
their values will not be functions of the individual ability level. In addition, Eq. (1.22) delivers the tradeo
between hiring permanent and casual labor at the planting stage, since it means that the relative labor costs,
as denoted by the right-hand side of the second equality, equal the sum of the expected marginal products
under the good state A0t 2 ( ~AM;  + "=2) and the bad state A0t 2 (   "=2; ~AM ). Because of the assumed
perfect substitution between permanent and casual labor it can be shown that
wPt 

(1  )b+ 1
c

+ E
h
b+
2
t(A0t)
i
=

(1  )b+ 1
c

+
Z +"=2
 "=2

b+
2
t(A0t)

dF (A0t); (1.24)
where the inequality comes from the loss of exibility under the bad state when deciding to hire one unit of
the permanent labor instead of one unit of casual substitute at both stages. Secondly, by comparing the two
large parentheses of Eq. (1.23), it can be shown that the marginal product of intermediate inputs (or sunk
investments) is enlarged under the good state since 1=(+    ) > 1. This is because the adjustment of
the labor input is available and it makes intermediate inputs become more productive.
24
Since uncertainty is represented by the parameter " and it governs the amount of variation within the
unform distribution, the comparative statics of uncertainty on the input combination 1 is written as
d1=d" =
 @fMP =@"
@fMP =@1
: (1.25)
Applying Leibniz's rule, I can derive
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and
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The second equality of Eq. (1.27) is derived by using the determination condition of ~AM based on Eq. (1.19)
and the positive, equal, or negative sign of Eq. (1.26) rests on the concavity, linearity or convexity of the
function b + 2t(A0t)
on A0t, respectively. Hence, I have d1=d" > 0 if the costs of hiring, b +
2
t(A0t)
, are
concave on A0t, as shown in [Figure 1.9a]. The assumption implies that the hiring costs do not increase too
dramatically and hence excludes the possibility of multiple equilibria and less reliance on casual labor under
high-productivity realizations. Because the threshold value ~AM is lowered as the degree of uncertainty rises,
the result d ~AM=d" < 0 implies that the rising uncertainty will increase the extent of reliance on casual labor.
In order to understand the inuence of uncertainty on the share of permanent labor at the planting stage
3, I derive the components of
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by using Eq. (1.20) and given d1=d" > 0 with
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The comparative statics shows that d3=d" < 0 and hence the casual-labor ratio at the planting stage,
n1Mt
nPMt +n
1M
t
= 1 3, is increasing in the degree of uncertainty. Moreover, the casual-labor ratio at the harvest
stage,
n2Mt
nPMt +n
2M
t
, is also increasing in the degree of uncertainty because of Eq. (1.18) and d1=d" > 0, which
hinges on the assumption that the marginal costs b+ 2t(A0t)
are concave on A0t.
Finally, the comparative statics of the ratio of labor ex-ante to intermediate inputs with respect to " is
d2=d" =
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; (1.32)
which is derived by using Eq. (1.23) and its components are
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Since the previous result shows that d1=d" > 0 and d3=d" < 0, the sign of @2=@" follows
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As an interesting benchmark, consider the case in which t is independent of A
0
t, and hence d1=d" = 0,
d2=d" > 0, and d3=d" < 0 as shown above. In this case, higher uncertainty not only raises the employment
share of casual labor, but also lowers the intensity of intermediate inputs.
The optimization problem of the traditional-type agents can be solved by following the same rule. The
details are omitted here to avoid redundance.
1.5 Quantitative analysis
In this section, I rst present how the model's key parameters are calibrated to t the micro data. Then,
I consider alternative values for (i) availability of casual labor and (ii) degree of uncertainty since they
represent the main channels to be highlighted in the model. Finally, related counterfactual experiments are
proposed to understand how various components contribute the two targets of interest.
1.5.1 Calibration
The parameters to be calibrated are summarized in [Table 5]. The calibration rule is at rst to choose the
values of parameters of the production functions (fM , Mg, T , , fA, Ag, fB , Bg) primarily based
on information from the data. Parameters of the labor matching function, which include ( m, ), are selected
based on the standard setting. The other parameters related to hiring or searching costs are calibrated to
match the main targets, the permanent-casual labor ratios (both ex-ante and ex-post) and the technology
adoption rate.
First, the share of land () is rstly set at 0.2 and the value follows Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008), due
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to the lack of the rental price of land from the data. The other two parameters of modern technology (M ,
M ) are pinned down by the following conditions: (i) the expenses on intermediate inputs account for nearly
20% of the value of output,12 and (ii) the wage costs from hiring labor ex-post account for 14% of the value
of output on average. Note that the wage costs are adjusted and remeasured by labor in eective units. An
essential reason is that a large proportion of the labor days is provided by female and child workers, and they
are considered on average to be less productive in agricultural production than males. Hence, the amount
of labor to be employed in terms of man labor days is computed by creating estimates of the relative wage
rate among the three groups. The computation work and sample selection criteria are described in more
detail in the appendix. For the traditional technology, the value of the parameter T is selected such that
the share of the wage costs from hiring labor ex-post to the value of output is around 27%{27.5%. Given
the selected values for the input shares, the realized A0it from traditional-type agents is constructed by
A0it =
yTit
zi
(
nPTit +n
1T
it
zi
)T (1 )(n
PT
it +n
2T
it
zi
)(1 T )(1 )
 lnN (2:77; 1:12); (1.36)
since individual-specic ability does not generate dierences in their nal output by assumption. In the same
manner, the product of two random variables is expressed as
A0itB
M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MM (1 )(n
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)M (1 M )(1 )(n
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)(1 M )(1 )
 lnN (3:36; 1:125):
(1.37)
The above two densities are displayed in [Figure 1.11]. It is further assumed that A0it from modern-type
agents follows the same distribution and that A0it and Bi are independent. Also note that all observed Bis
are from individuals with Bi > B since only agents with a relatively high ability choose modern technology.
12Based on sample mean values from the data, the share of intermediate inputs is set at 0.2, which is closer to the value
(0.25) predicted by Donovan (2014) for poor economies than the value (0.4) selected by Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) based
on the U.S. case.
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This implies that the observed Bi is drawn from the conditional distribution
(BijBi > B)  lnN ( 0:59
MM (1  ) ;
0:009
(MM (1  ))2 ) = lnN (1:675; 0:225):
Using the properties of a truncated normal distribution and the above two moment conditions, the underlying
parameters B , B, and B are pinned down jointly by including an additional condition to be matched,
namely, the 10% technology adoption rate.
Second, the parameters of the matching function are set as m = 1 and  = 0:5, and the setting follows
standard assumptions since the data are not informative to the values. The value for the quantity of labor
representing the potential total supply of casual labor per unit of land, which is denoted by N=z, is calibrated
to meet the ex-ante casual-labor ratio, which is around 70% on average.
Finally, the parameters regarding hiring costs are selected based on the following rule. The data show that
the ratio of average labor days per worker in period 2 to period 1 is 7.12/19.65 for modern-type agents and is
8.32/22.89 for traditional-type ones, and the two ratios are close to 0.36. This implies that =(1 )  0:36,
and the duration of the harvesting stage accounts for 26.5% of the time for the entire t. The labor wage of
the entire t is represented by b, and the value is calibrated such that the endogenous value B to be solved by
the model meets the values with a 10% technology adoption rate. Still, there is a lack of related information
on the searching costs based on the data, and hence the costs at the planting stage 1 are tentatively assumed
to be a small value, say, 1% of the labor wage b. The last parameter represents that of the searching costs
at the harvest stage 2, and it is calibrated to meet the ex-post casual-labor ratio on average.
The calibration results, including the key variables of targets or non-targets, are shown in the sub-panel
of [Table 5]. They predict around a 1.73{1.83-fold stage-contingent dierence in the labor productivity gaps
between the two technologies, which is somewhat lower than the 2.13-fold observed from the micro data.
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[Figure 1.12] displays a decreasing pattern of matching probabilities with respect to dierent realized values
of A0t in equilibrium in the benchmark model, as argued in Section 1.3.
1.5.2 Sensitivity analysis
Based on the values of the parameters selected by the previous work, comparative statics involving
exogenously changing the calibrated values is carried out by means of quantitative exercises. The results
are presented in [Figure 1.14] and also listed in [Table 6] in detail. Compared with the benchmark economy,
the rst two exercises to some extent capture the idea of a change in the availability of casual labor. Panel
A shows that exogenously doubled searching costs ex-post will have a larger positive eect on the ex-post
permanent labor ratio nPMt =(n
PM
t + n
2M
t ) than the ex-ante ratio n
PM
t =(n
PM
t + n
1M
t ) since the change will
directly depress the demand for casual labor ex-post, leading to an indirect eect on the labor input that is
determined ex-ante. On the other hand, the increased searching costs raise the proportion of agents choosing
modern technology (denoted as M ) from 10.9% to 23.8%.13 Meanwhile, since the change in the productivity
gaps with respect to dierent states is moderate, switches between two technologies because of the extensive
margin eect contribute most of the aggregate productivity gains.
Panel B presents an eect that results from diminishing the pool of available casual labor by 90%.
Diering from the previous result, this eect is rather comprehensive since it enlarges the expected costs
from hiring one unit of casual labor both ex-ante and ex-post. Hence, the quantitative results suggest
that these will be a pronounced increase in the permanent labor ratio not only ex-post but also ex-ante in
equilibrium. Another intuitive feature is that the fraction for choosing modern technology also increases,
but the eect is relatively small when compared with solely increasing the hiring costs ex-post.
13The result is in line with one of the ndings from Manuelli and Seshadri (2014), who provide historical evidence in the
U.S. that a rise in labor costs could accelerate the adoption of less-labor-intensive technology in the long run.
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The results in Panel C highlight the eects from imposing a higher degree of uncertainty through mean-
preserving spreads. Note that the two related parameters of the log-normal distributions are adjusted
so that their standard deviations increase while their mean values are left unchanged. The results show
that, compared with the benchmark, a doubled degree of uncertainty will in general cause agents to rely
more on casual labor both ex-ante and ex-post. Most importantly, it gives rise to 34% of agents who had
previously chosen modern technology deciding to switch. As noted, the decrease in the adoption rate of
modern technology is driven by the extensive-margin eect and the channel that makes the eect work is
the availability of hiring casual labor ex-post. Panel D serves as a complementary exercise to the previous
one, since it presents the eect from reducing the degree of uncertainty by half through mean-preserving
contractions.
Finally, Panel E reports the results by taking a lowered degree of uncertainty combined with doubled
searching costs into account. Compared with any single eect presented in Panel A and Panel D, the
joint eect will motivate more agents to adopt modern technology. Meanwhile, a moderate decrease in
the productivity gaps implies that the aggregate productivity gains are mostly attributed to the increased
number of agents switching from traditional to modern technology.
1.5.3 Counterfactual experiments
Three related counterfactual experiments are implemented as follows. In the rst exercise, I shut down
the availability of casual labor while leaving the quantity of permanent labor xed. In the second, the
economy is assumed to have an abundance of casual labor at the harvest stage (with a matching probability
equal to 1). This case considers whether a counterfactual eect from a fully exible adjustment to labor
will benet one of the technologies more. In the third case, agents are characterized by perfect foresight and
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hence are not vulnerable to uncertainty.
The rst experiment is conducted to deal with the essential question: how will agents change their ex-ante
decisions if an ex-post adjustment in the labor input is not available? The quantity of permanent labor is
restricted to the same level as that for the benchmark economy; more precisely
NCFt = min
Z 
nPMt + n
1M
t

dF (Bi) + (1  M )

nPTt + n
1T
t (A
0
t)

;
Z 
nPMt + n
2M
t

dF (Bi) + (1  M )

nPTt + n
2T
t (A
0
t)

;
in which the aggregate supply of labor NCFt is the minimum computed value of the total labor to be hired ex-
ante and ex-post in the benchmark economy. This condition is imposed to conne the scale of the permanent
labor market to a comparable basis with the benchmark. The quantitative results indicate that M will be
around 19.4%{20.5%, and suggest that eliminating casual labor will motivate more agents to choose modern
technology, nearly doubling the adoption rate compared to the benchmark case.
In the second experiment, the moments of interest to be predicted are (M , n1Mt =n
2M
t (A
0
t), y
M
t (A
0
t)=n
M
t (A
0
t))
= (0.008, 0.243, 2.015), and the state-contingent variables are evaluated by setting A0t equal to the median
value. The results show that almost all agents will choose traditional technology ex-ante, if labor is allowed
to be fully adjusted ex-post with perfect matching. In addition, the labor ratio ex-ante to ex-post drops
from 0.666 (= 0.504/0.757, in benchmark) to 0.243 because there is no need to stock up labor ex-ante to save
search cost ex-post. Meanwhile, the lower adoption will trigger a decreased aggregate labor productivity due
to a mild increase in the productivity gap compared to the benchmark.
The third experiment concerns the impact of eliminating uncertainty. The agents in this case are assumed
to have perfect foresight, and hence their ex-ante decisions will be state-contingent and unrelated to the degree
of uncertainty. Put dierently, they can fully expect their future demand for casual labor with respect to
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dierent realizations and hence will behave similarly by making all their decisions ex-ante. [Figure 1.15]
shows that the computed adoption rates corresponding to the realized A0t of the 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th, and
99th percentiles are 0.4%, 5.0%, 10.2%, 23.6%, and 69.0%. A noteworthy result observed from the gure is
that the adoption rate at the mean, i.e., A0t = A, equals 21.6%, which is more than twice the value in the
benchmark economy (10.9%, on the red line). This again validates the conjecture of how the adoption rate
can be improved by mitigating the extensive-margin eect of uncertainty.
1.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, a channel to connect the inuence of production uncertainty on agents' ex-ante technology
choices is proposed, i.e., the availability of hiring casual labor ex-post, in order to explain two targets of
interest: the low adoption rate of modern technology and low aggregate productivity in poor countries. I
rst document stylized facts about how the labor paid on a daily basis accounts for a larger proportion of
the labor force in the agricultural sector based on referring to ocial publications from multiple countries.
To account for a potential miscounting problem, I look for detailed input-output information from each basic
production unit by using micro data.
A tractable two-stage model is then built and an aggregate shock is introduced to a staged production
process. Diering from the existing literature, the generalized model is designed to highlight the ex-ante
technology adoption problem optimized by heterogenous agents. Two competing eects derived from a
rise in the degree of uncertainty are evaluated at the extensive and intensive margins under the formalized
framework. Because of the availability to make adjustments to the labor input ex-post, an increase in
the degree of uncertainty will lead more agents to depart from modern technology along with higher labor
productivity. This contributes to the extensive-margin eect as suggested in this chapter. Meanwhile, for
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an agent who has chosen to be of the modern-type, the opposite intensive margin eect will be responsible
for a more intensive use of intermediate inputs or more sunk ex-ante investments.
Quantitative analysis is conducted based on a benchmark economy which is calibrated to match the
main features from the micro-data. The numerical results of comparative statics are presented to access
the eects of uncertainty; especially, how they are amplied through the proposed channel. Three counter-
factual experiments are in addition provided to ascertain the signicance of the channel, and are conducted
by cases of (i) an unavailability of a labor adjustment ex-post, (ii) a wholly exible labor adjustment, and
(iii) agents with perfect foresight of future shocks. The quantitative results suggest that the severity of the
uncertainty and an abundance of casual labor at the harvest stage are important drivers for low adoption and
low productivity in a developing country. These factors also help to explain why agricultural productivity
in poor countries is low relative to productivity in the non-agricultural sectors.
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Figure 1.3: Timeline and agent i's decisions at time t (the simplied model)
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Comparative statics from the simplied model
A heterogeneous agent with ability Bi = Bi is considering the following optimization problem
V (Bi; Z) = maxfM;Tg

VM (Bi; Z) ; V
T ( Z)
	
;
in which the variable of individual-specic ability Bi follows all assumptions that have been made. The
setting of dual production technology mainly follows the Cobb-Douglas form by Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu
(2008) and Yang and Zhu (2013), i.e.,
YMt = A
0
t
 
(BiXt)
N1 t
 Z1  ;
35
Y Tt = A
0
tN

t
Z1  :
The timeline of this simplied case is displayed in [Figure 1.3] and an additional assumption is made under
the baseline framework: labor is fully hired ex-post but intermediate inputs are determined ex-ante. The
backward solution shows that for a modern-type agent the use of inputs follows
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t ) and g is a positive function of  and ". Accordingly, the prot functions of
both types are increasing in realized A0t
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The expected prots (values) from choosing modern and traditional technologies are
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is a positive function of Bi.
Note that for an agent with idiosyncratic ability Bi the expected values in choosing both types are
equalized so that E(
Mt ) = E(
Tt ) if  = 0 or " = 0. The two conditions imply that either the share of
intermediate inputs is zero or there is no uncertainty during the production process. Secondly, it can be
shown that E(A
0 11 
t )  E(A
0 1
1 (1 )
t )
1 +
1  by Jensen's inequality. Hence, for an agent with Bi = B such
that E(
Mt ) = E(
Tt ), an exogenous rise in uncertainty will relatively increase the value of choosing the
traditional type more if  6= 0 and " 6= 0. This contributes the extensive-margin eect and motivates the
agent, who was indierent between choosing the two alternatives before, to depart from modern technology.
Thirdly, uncertainty does not have any eect if no inputs are allowed to be adjusted ex-post. Finally, the
setting of the production functions implies labor productivity in an economy without market distortions:
yMt
nMt
=
wt
(1  ) 
wt

=
yTt
nTt
;
and the productivity gap captures what is observed from the micro data if the value of  is suciently large.
1.7.2 Structural estimation under the simplied model
Since the extent to which uncertainty inuences agents' decisions rests on the parameters of the two
production functions, an inaccurately measured value may under- or overstate the results from the counter-
factual analysis. Based on available information regarding the input-output combination for each production
unit, the structural estimation proceeds in the following context.
Assume Ai = Ai where i
i:i:d lnN ( ; ) and i i:i:d lnN ( ; ). Denote the structural param-
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eters to be estimated by  = (M ; M ; T ;  ;  ;  ; )
0. An observation from agent i includes !i =
(yi; di; xi; li; zi)
0, in which i's discrete technology choice di 2 fM;Tg and yi, xi, li, and zi respectively rep-
resent agent i's observable decisions on output, and the quantity of intermediate inputs, labor and land.
Individual ability i is a latent variable and known by agent i. The likelihood function is built upon
L(;!1; ::; !N ) =
NY
i=1
Li(jdi; yi; xi; li; zi) =
NX
i=1
lnLi(jdi; yi; xi; li; zi);
in which each
Li(jyi; di; xi; li; zi) = Pr(yi; di; xi; lijzi) =
Z
Pr(yi; di; xi; lijzi; i)f(i)di
=
Z Z
f(yijdi; xi; li; zi; i; i)f(xi; lijdi; zi; i)Pr(dijzi; i)f(i)f(i)didi
=
Z Z
f(yijdi; xi; li; zi; i; i)f(lijdi; xi; zi; i)f(xijdi; zi; i)Pr(dijzi; i)f(i)f(i)didi
=
Z Z
f(yijdi; xi; li; zi; i; i)
h Z
f(lijdi; xi; zi; i; i)f(i)di
i
f(xijdi; zi; i)Pr(dijzi; i)f(i)f(i)didi
(A.1.5)
in which the second and third equalities of Eq. (A.1.5) hold because both the unobservable ability i and the
productivity shock i are assumed to be independent and identically distributed random variables. Since
ln(yMi ) = ln(Ai) + 
MM

ln(Bi) + ln(xi)

+ (1  M )M ln(li) + (1  M )ln(zi);
I can derive that
f
 
ln(yi)jdi=M;xi; li; zi; i; i; 
  N (My ; My );
where
My = C
M + MM lnxi + (1  M )M lnli + (1  M )lnzi +  + MM ;
My =  + (
MM )2 :
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Because of conditions (A.1.1) and (A.1.2), the conditional densities f
 
ln(li)jdi=M;xi; zi; i; i

and f
 
ln(xi)jdi=
M; zi; i

are also Gaussian. The conditional probability of discrete choice di is
Pr(dijzi; i) = Pr(di=M jzi; i)I(di=M)
h
1  Pr(di=M jzi; i)
i1 I(di=M)
= Pr

E[
Mi jzi; i]  E[
Ti jzi; i] > 0
I(di=M)
Pr

E[
Mi jzi; i]  E[
Ti jzi; i] < 0
1 I(di=M)
;
where the indicator function I(di =M) = 1 while di = M . Hence, Pr(dijzi; i) is a function of structural
parameters as stated.
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Figure 1.4: Probability of suering losses and cross-regional adoption rate of Tanzania
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Figure 1.5: Expost labor per hectare vs log value of prot per hectare: (n2 + nP )= Z in blue dots and nP = Z
in red dots
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Figure 1.6: Land and labor productivity by percentile
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Figure 1.7: Land and labor productivity by technology type
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Figure 1.14: Sensitivity analysis on permanent labor share (left) and labor productivity gap (right)
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Table 1.1: Percentage of casual and regular waged labor by gender and by sector from dierent
rounds of labor survey of India*
Casual labor male female total male female total wage (daily)
Survey period (round) rural urban rural urban
Jul.2011{Jun.12 (68nd) 35.5% 35.1% 35.4% 14.9% 14.3% 14.8% 138.62 170.10
Jul.2009{Jun.10 (66nd) 38.0% 39.9% 38.6% 17.0% 19.6% 17.5% 93.06 121.83
Jul.2007{Jun.08 (64th) 35.5% 37.6% 36.2% 15.4% 19.9% 16.2% 60.33 72.24
Jul.2005{Jun.06 (62nd) 33.3% 33.9% . 15.7% 16.5% .
Jul.2004{Jun.05 (61st) 32.9% 32.6% 32.8% 14.6% 16.7% 15.0% 48.89 68.68
Jan.{Jun.2004 (60th) 33.5% 34.7% . 15.3% 19.2% .
Jan.{Dec.2003 (59th) 33.5% 35.1% . 15.6% 20.7% .
Jul.{Dec.2002 (58th) 34.4% 40.6% . 15.0% 23.3% .
Jul.2001{Jun.02 (57th) 33.9% 38.2% . 15.4% 26.1% .
Jul.2000{Jun.01 (56th) 31.6% 37.5% . 17.5% 24.1% .
Jul.1999{Jun.00 (55th) 36.2% 39.6% 37.4% 16.8% 21.4% 17.7% 40.23 57.98
Jan.{Jun.1998 (54th) 37.7% 44.2% . 18.1% 28.8% .
Jan.{Dec.1997 (53rd) 33.3% 40.9% . 18.5% 29.0% .
Jul.1995{Jun.96 (52nd) 33.3% 41.2% . 16.5% 26.8% .
Jul.1994{Jun.95 (51st) 32.8% 40.8% . 16.5% 27.3% .
Jul.1993{Jun.94 (50th) 33.8% 38.7% 35.6% 16.3% 26.1% 18.3% 20.54 28.77
* The data are obtained from (i) Employment and Unemployment Situation in India 2007-08, pp. 39{41,
50 and 52, (ii) Key Indicators of Employment and Unemployment in India 2009{2010, pp. 16, 19 and 20,
and (iii) Key Indicators of Employment and Unemployment in India 2011{2012, pp. 18, 15 and 23. All
of the reports are published by the National Sample Survey Oce (NSSO) of India.
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Table 1.2: Total employment by industry and employment status in Tanzania (persons)
Employees 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 2010 2011 2012
Agriculture
Regular 45946 65256 37459 47051 47051 55063 44884 49932
Casual 31327 34887 42973 96832 56084 83011 128370 45923
Share (casual) 0.41 0.35 0.53 0.67 0.54 0.60 0.74 0.48
Non-Agriculture
Regular 649241 611407 770537 764926 851992 964441 1057589 1273801
Casual 92346 214063 173371 176433 205007 174467 131716 180362
Share (casual) 0.12 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.12
Notes: The data are obtained from the Employment and Earnings Survey, Analytical Reports 2001, 2002,
2007, 2011, and 2012, which are published by the National Bureau of Statistics of the United Republic of
Tanzania. The employees are dened as all wage earners and salaried employees whether full-time, part-time,
or casually for a full working day.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics by household-level survey (LSMS-ISA) in Tanzania
TZA (08-09) TZA (10-11) TZA (12-13)
-Number of effective samples (unit: plot) 5126 6038 7447
-Share of subsistence crops cultivated 75.33% 77.14% 71.68%
-Ownership of this plot (owned) 83.26% 84.27% 84.25%
-Did you use any organic fertilizer (yes) 10.66% 10.68% 11.76%
-Did you use any inorganic fertilizer (yes) 10.90% 12.80% 11.20%
-Did you use pesticide/herbicide (yes) 10.75% 9.01% 9.86%
-Average values of inorganic fertilizer (TSH) 62060.46 60312.7 88189.25
-(If used), why choose this type of fertilizer
(own experience) 67.98% 49.43% 56.15%
(advice from agricultural officer or neighbor) 31.34% 30.90% 31.69%
-Did you receive any seeds, fertilizer,
pesticide/herbicide on credit (yes) 1.05% 0.96% 1.59%
-Was area harvested less than planted (yes) 26.53% 31.31% 29.74%
-If yes, the main reason?
(drought + rain) 51.85% 67.72% 63.13%
(lack of casual labor) 1.23% 0.96% 0.77%
-Did you hire any labor to work on this plot
in the long rainy season1 (yes) 31.14% 27.03% 32.00%
-Casual labor share (by days) if employed any 25.33% 30.75% 29.84%
-Labor days hired for planting2 11.6671 11.9608 13.8659
-Labor days hired for weeding 13.4630 13.6967 15.5407
-Labor days hired for fertilizing NA 5.7641 6.8601
-Labor days hired for harvesting 11.4565 12.4678 13.9121
-Average daily wage (TSH) paid for planting 2405.55 3094.37 3819.35
-Average daily wage (TSH) paid for harvesting 2041.37 2152.74 3000.76
-Labor prod. if using inorganic fertilizer (TSH/day) 4116.25 4320.42
-Labor prod. if not using inorganic fertilizer 1930.63 2035.93
(TSH/day)
1 The long rainy season in Tanzania lasts during March to May.
2 The labor was hired on a daily basis.
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Table 1.4: Description of the data by pairwise correlation, years 2010{11 (upper) and 2008{09 (lower)
2010--11
Variables s.crop o.fert i.fert p.cide ir.gate c.labor c.ratio land l.prodt
s.crop 1.000
o.fert -0.010 1.000
i.fert 0.061** 0.089** 1.000
p.cide -0.146** 0.164** 0.267** 1.000
ir.gate -0.045** 0.083** 0.102** 0.098** 1.000
c.labor 0.006 0.000 0.064** 0.124** 0.060** 1.000
c.ratio -0.023 -0.016 0.039** 0.099** 0.102** 0.690** 1.000
land -0.018 -0.002 0.040** 0.078** -0.006 0.114** 0.069** 1.000
l.prodt -0.074** 0.036* 0.145** 0.156** 0.151** 0.158** 0.230** 0.097** 1.000
2008--09
Variables s.crop o.fert i.fert p.cide ir.gate c.labor c.ratio land l.prodt
s.crop 1.000
o.fert -0.012 1.000
i.fert 0.033* 0.138** 1.000
p.cide -0.148** 0.140** 0.257** 1.000
ir.gate -0.056** 0.128** 0.160** 0.181** 1.000
c.labor 0.009 0.036* 0.066** 0.095** 0.060** 1.000
c.ratio 0.008 0.056** 0.084** 0.089** 0.107** 0.654** 1.000
land -0.007 -0.013 -0.010 0.024 -0.011 0.080** 0.102** 1.000
l.prodt -0.075** 0.081** 0.182** 0.201** 0.138** 0.148** 0.259** 0.120** 1.000
1. The data are obtained from the LSMS-ISA of the World Bank. Observations are from the agriculture
survey on Tanzania in the year 2010{2011 by merging Tables 2A, 3A, and 4A. The land size of each plot is
obtained from Table 2A, the value of output harvested is from Table 4A, and all the other information is
from Table 3A.
2. Variables: s.crop = 1 if subsistence crop cultivated (dummy); o.fert = use of organic fertilizer (dummy);
i.fert = use of inorganic fertilizer (dummy); p.cide = use of pesticide/herbicide (dummy); ir.gate = irrigation
(dummy); c.labor = hired any casual labor during the past production season (dummy); c.ratio = ratio
of hours worked by casual labor to hours of total labor; land = size of plot based on GPS measurement;
l.prodt = labor productivity measured by value of output harvested divided by total hours worked by labor
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Table 1.5: Summary of parameters to be calibrated
Parameter Values Target/source
Production functions
(M ; M ) (0.83, 0.30) Based on intermediate input share and labor share from the data
(modern-type only)
T 0.65 Based on labor shares from the data (traditional-type only)
 0.20 Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008)
(logA; logA) (2.77, 1.12) Computed from the data
(logB ; logB) (-0.35, 1.15) Computed from the data
Costs of hiring labor
b 1.65 Calibrated to meet 10% technology adoption rate
 0.265 By average labor days provided by each worker (ratio of ex-ante to ex-post)
1 1%
b Assumed to be 1% of labor wages
2 0.6
1 Calibrated to meet casual labor ratio (ex-post)
Matching function
m 1 Standard
 0.5 Standard
N=z 0.0125 Calibrated to meet casual labor ratio (ex-ante)
Calibrated parameters in benchmark: b = 1:65, N=z = 0:0125, 2 = 0:61
Calibration targets: (i) technology type, (ii) permanent labor ratio ex-ante, and (iii) permanent labor ratio ex-post
M
nPMt
nPMt +n
1M
t
nPTt
nPTt +n
1T
t
nPMt
nPMt +n
2M
t (A
0
t)
0.109 0.504 0.815 0.999 0.922 0.863 0.809 0.757 0.704 0.648 0.585 0.509 0.393
Non-calibration targets: labor productivity gaps between modern and traditional technologies
yMt
(nPMt +n
1M
t )+(1 )(nPMt +n2Mt )
=
yTt
(nPTt +n
1T
t )+(1 )(nPTt +n2Tt )
1.732 1.740 1.746 1.752 1.760 1.768 1.777 1.789 1.807 1.839
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Table 1.6: Quantitative exercises
[Panel A] comparative statics 1: b = 1:65, N=z = 0:0125, 2 = 1:21, A
0
t  lnN (2:77; 1:12)
M
nPMt
nPMt +n
1M
t
nPTt
nPTt +n
1T
t
nPMt
nPMt +n
2M
t (A
0
t)
0.238 0.494 0.829 1.000 0.956 0.919 0.883 0.845 0.803 0.756 0.700 0.627 0.503
Labor productivity gaps between modern and traditional technologies
yMt
(nPMt +n
1M
t )+(1 )(nPMt +n2Mt )
=
yTt
(nPTt +n
1T
t )+(1 )(nPTt +n2Tt )
1.708 1.712 1.717 1.721 1.726 1.732 1.739 1.749 1.763 1.793
[Panel B] comparative statics 2: b = 1:65, N=z = 0:00125, 2 = 0:61, A
0
t  lnN (2:77; 1:12)
M
nPMt
nPMt +n
1M
t
nPTt
nPTt +n
1T
t
nPMt
nPMt +n
2M
t (A
0
t)
0.155 0.691 1.206 1.000 0.981 0.963 0.945 0.924 0.899 0.869 0.830 0.773 0.661
Labor productivity gaps between modern and traditional technologies
yMt
(nPMt +n
1M
t )+(1 )(nPMt +n2Mt )
=
yTt
(nPTt +n
1T
t )+(1 )(nPTt +n2Tt )
1.757 1.759 1.761 1.764 1.766 1.770 1.774 1.780 1.789 1.809
[Panel C] comparative statics 3: b = 1:65, N=z = 0:0125, 2 = 0:61, A
0
t  lnN (2:42; 1:40)
M
nPMt
nPMt +n
1M
t
nPTt
nPTt +n
1T
t
nPMt
nPMt +n
2M
t (A
0
t)
0.072 0.507 0.799 0.999 0.894 0.820 0.757 0.698 0.641 0.582 0.519 0.445 0.337
Labor productivity gaps between modern and traditional technologies
yMt
(nPMt +n
1M
t )+(1 )(nPMt +n2Mt )
=
yTt
(nPTt +n
1T
t )+(1 )(nPTt +n2Tt )
1.746 1.755 1.762 1.770 1.779 1.788 1.799 1.812 1.831 1.864
[Panel D] comparative statics 4: b = 1:65, N=z = 0:0125, 2 = 0:61, A
0
t  lnN (3:15; 0:70)
M
nPMt
nPMt +n
1M
t
nPTt
nPTt +n
1T
t
nPMt
nPMt +n
2M
t (A
0
t)
0.168 0.500 0.826 0.999 0.944 0.899 0.856 0.812 0.765 0.714 0.654 0.578 0.456
Labor productivity gaps between modern and traditional technologies
yMt
(nPMt +n
1M
t )+(1 )(nPMt +n2Mt )
=
yTt
(nPTt +n
1T
t )+(1 )(nPTt +n2Tt )
1.719 1.724 1.729 1.735 1.740 1.747 1.755 1.766 1.782 1.813
[Panel E] comparative statics 5: b = 1:65, N=z = 0:0125, 2 = 1:21, A
0
t  lnN (3:15; 0:70)
M
nPMt
nPMt +n
1M
t
nPTt
nPTt +n
1T
t
nPMt
nPMt +n
2M
t (A
0
t)
0.332 0.491 0.839 0.999 0.969 0.942 0.914 0.884 0.850 0.810 0.761 0.692 0.570
Labor productivity gaps between modern and traditional technologies
yMt
(nPMt +n
1M
t )+(1 )(nPMt +n2Mt )
=
yTt
(nPTt +n
1T
t )+(1 )(nPTt +n2Tt )
1.697 1.701 1.704 1.707 1.711 1.716 1.722 1.730 1.742 1.769
Note: All computations are executed 500 times and each time 500 samples are drawn from the distribution Bi 
lnN ( 0:35; 1:15)
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Chapter 2
Growth in a Patrilocal Economy:
Female Schooling, Household Savings,
and China's One-Child Policy
2.1 Introduction
The rise of education attainment of females relative to males is widely observed in both developed and
emerging countries.1 The shrinking gender gap in education opportunity is prominent in the case of China.
In this chapter, we develop an overlapping generation (OLG) model in order to understand the interactions
between fertility, savings, and gender dierence in education. An important application of the model is to
illustrate the eects of a population regulation, i.e., the China's \One-Child Policy" (OCP), on female-to-
male schooling ratio as well as the propensity for households to save for retirement. To our knowledge, this
chapter is the rst to connect the rise of China's savings with the gender dierence on relative changes of
human capital under the OCP. The motivation is that raising children (and hence investing their education)
is taken as an important means of savings, in addition to other possible savings instruments.
1Please refer to Becker et al. (2010), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2013), Orazem and King (2007), among others. In Section
2.1, we also refer to the gender parity index (GPI) provided by UNESCO as a measure of the gender gap.
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This chapter is motivated by four stylized facts in China after the implementation of the OCP in late
1970s. Firstly, the cohorts who were born under the OCP have a rising trend of female-to-male enrollment
in high school. Such a trend is even more dramatic when we take into account a growing imbalance of sex
ratio in these cohorts. Secondly, when we break down the data of school enrollment into family sizes, there
is an inverse relationship between the number of children a family has and the relative chances of a young
woman attending schools compared with a young man. Thirdly, during the same period, the rates of return
to women's schooling are persistently higher than men's (Zhang et al., 2005), suggesting a dierential of
parents' incentive to invest in their daughters' and sons' education, or a \son preference." Finally, we draw
conclusions from a household survey on their reasons to save to show the origin of the son preference: the
more sons a household has, the less need for the household to save for retirement.
To highlight our channels, we model parental transfers as parents' investment in children's human capital
through schooling, and we model lial transfers as nancial support provided by sons after retirement. We
assume that sons are more likely to provide their parents old-age support (Banerjee et al., 2014; Zhou, 2014).
It is consistent with a patrilocal social norm which requires a married couple to live with or close to the
husband's parents. Therefore, sons' support is a substitute for the parent's savings, and a household might
choose to invest more in sons' education so that sons could provide more support when their parents are old.
Parental investment in education of their children, therefore, depends on the degree of parental altruism and
the need for old-age security.
The degree of parental altruism is aected by the household's fertility decisions via the quantity-quality
trade-o a la Barro and Becker (1989). Lower fertility induces higher parental altruistic behavior toward
children and hence benets both sons and daughters. Nevertheless, diminishing marginal returns in schooling
implies that sons' education becomes a less ecient means of providing old-age support. Thus the son
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preference is weakened. In addition, if there is a sex division of labor, women's human capital depreciates
more than men's after reproduction. Therefore, expecting that daughters will also have fewer ospring,
altruistic parents will invest more in daughters' education. Both eects tend to increase the relative female
schooling. Nevertheless, the gap in the rate of return to schooling persists due to the additional benets for
parents to increase sons' earnings.
Several authors have documented gender dierence of schooling in China. For example, the gender-based
dierence in rate of return to schooling is examined by Zhang et al. (2005) and Chen and Hamori (2009)
by respectively using data from China Urban Household Surveys (UHS) and China Health and Nutrition
Surveys (CHNS).2 Their estimation results based on Mincerian wage regressions reconcile the ndings from
Psacharopoulos (1994) in most of developing countries' cases. The simultaneous rise in both female relative
schooling years and returns to female schooling is also noted by Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan (2012). In
order to incorporate the estimated marginal eect of schooling on wage income based on micro evidence and
thereby model the gender dierence, we adopt the setting of individual human capital by Bils and Klenow
(2000) into the production function.
Our model could also explain the change of households' demand on savings. There are two opposing forces
that aect household savings. Firstly, parents need to save more for old age security when they have fewer
sons. Secondly, higher parental altruism puts more weight on children's welfare over old age consumption,
and therefore reduces the need for saving for retirement. Assuming that the elasticity of parental altruism
with respect to number of children is not too large, we see household savings increase with lower fertility as
observed in the data.3
2Underlying forces that drive the prominent dierence, argued by Rosenzweig and Zhang (2013) and Zhang et al. (2005),
are females' comparative advantage on skilled work and a self-selection eect.
3To keep our model tractable, we do not consider other reasons to save, such as a bequest motive. Incorporating this motive
will further increase the saving demand and make it easier to match the data.
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The ascending savings in China has been documented by Yang, Zhang, and Zhou (2011), which is
characterized by persistently high saving rate and its strikingly upward pattern since economic reforms
began in 1978. This dramatic increase in domestic savings is distinct to other developed and emerging
economies especially for years 2000 to 2008. Possible explanations put forward by the literature include
precautionary motives, habit formation, and reasons related to demographic changes resulted from the OCP.
However, when it comes to the most reliable old-age income support, the answer is mostly children instead
of household savings or pensions.4
This chapter is therefore closely related to a growing literature that connects the relation between house-
hold savings (or capital accumulation) and demographic changes.5 Modigliani and Cao (2004) suggest that
changes in China's demographic structure started since the implement of population-related policies con-
tributes to the rising saving rate in China. Among these studies, the one closest to ours is done by Banerjee
et al. (2014), which also analyzes the general equilibrium eect of China's OCP on household savings. They
consider a counterfactual removal of the OCP and show that the partial equilibrium eect estimated from
micro data is oset by the increase in interest rates. That is, relaxation of population control policy may not
lead to substantially descending of household savings while taking the rise of population and hence the rise
of interest rate into account. In contrast, our model suggests that the rise of human capital with population
control could be substantial, and that the general-equilibrium eect may amplify instead of dampening the
saving motive under the OCP.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents empirical ndings from aggregate data
as well as household surveys. Section 2.3 presents an OLG general equilibrium model and points to an
4The argument is based on the survey question from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) 2011-12
baseline survey, in which 66% and 21% of cross-region participants answer children and pensions.
5Please refer to Boldrin and Jones (2002), Banerjee, Meng, and Qian (2010), Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2013),
Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark (2015), and Ge, Yang, and Zhang (2012), for example.
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additional channel for forward looking parents. Section 2.5 concludes and outlines future work.
2.2 Motivating facts
The data used in this chapter are obtained mainly from two sources. We rst summarize the stylized facts
regarding female secondary education based on the statistics from China Education Statistical Yearbooks
(CESY, 1973-2012). In order to highlight our points, micro evidence regarding households decisions on
education is mostly derived from the Chinese House Income Project of 2002 (CHIP-2002, hereafter).
Why the case of China is prominent? The case is noteworthy not just because of its inuential demo-
graphic policy but also because its equality of education opportunity is improved rapidly in the context of
a cross-country comparison. In order to measure the equality of education opportunity, we apply the GPI
provided by UNESCO and the index is constructed by using gross enrollment ratio (GER) of females relative
to males. The most advantage of this indicator is that it not only delivers the female-to-male enrollment
ratio in a static sense but also shows how the dynamics is taken place over time; see Subrahmanian (2005).
In Table 2.1, we focus on the main East Asia and the Pacic countries (with population 2 million and
above) and compare the changes of GPI across countries over the same period; that is around year 1995{
2010. The GPI of China increases dramatically compared to other countries/regions in the tertiary level.
In order to take dierent initial values into account, we also compute the relative change rates of GER of
females relative to males across countries. The second indicator again conrms that females gained access
to higher education more than other countries/regions.
2.2.1 Motivations from the aggregate data
[Figure 2.1] shows the series of the percentage of female students enrolled in lower- and uppe - secondary
education in the upper panel, while the series of percentage of female new-entrants in the lower panel. Three
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points of time are marked for noteworthy episodes. The year 1979, which is marked by OCP, is regarded
as the starting year of the rigorous implement of the OCP. The year 1986 is the time when China enforced
9-year compulsory education on both men and women and it is denoted by CE9. Finally, the point marked
by Y15 represents the year 1994 when the rst cohort of teenagers who were born under the OCP reached
15 years old.
The point Y15 is marked in order to underscore the impact of the OCP on secondary education, because
it is also the time when the cohort is expected to enter senior high school. The enrollment ratio of female
students in lower-secondary education is selected as a benchmark for comparison because after CE9 both
boys and girls are equally required to attend junior high schools, suggesting a comprehensive policy eect.
As shown in the gure, this ratio increases after CE9 and reaches a long-run rate of 47%, and meanwhile
the entrance ratio of female students exhibits a consistent pattern. On the other hand, the enrollment ratio
of female students in upper-secondary education remains stable around 40% before Y15. As suggested by
the upper panel of [Figure 2.2], it starts to increase and eventually overtakes males' the enrollment ratio in
upper-secondary level around year 2007, implying that females are more likely to enter high schools than
males.
In order to present this change, we construct the following index to measure the relative opportunity of
accessing higher education between female and male graduates from junior high school in year t; namely,
GPIt =
female new entrants of SHS=female graduates from JHS
male new entrants of SHS=male graduates from JHS
;
in which SHS and JHS are abbreviations of upper and lower secondary schools, respectively. This index is
informative because compared to the previous ratios it additionally reduces the inuence of the changing sex
ratio over time. It is comparable to the GPI though a mild dierence is that our index uses the number of
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current-year graduates from junior high schools as a proxy to the number of potential students.6 As shown
in the lower panel of [Figure 2.2], the index attains the minimum value around 1997 and after that it grows.
That is, the rising trend of women' secondary education becomes more striking when taking the imbalanced
sex ratio into account.
One might suspect that this trend is due to a change in the rate of return to schooling between men
and women. However, as argued by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) and Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan
(2012), women typically have a dominating rate of return to schooling in developing countries. In addition,
[Figure 2.3] presents the estimated returns to years of schooling by gender in China based on Zhang et al.
(2005) and it shows females have persistently higher returns than males during the period 1988{2001.7 Since
women always have a persistently higher return to schooling in China, here a question arises due to the
change of relative education opportunity. We argue that it could be a result of the change in long-standing
\son preference" in China's society, and the OCP is one of the key drivers.
Another noteworthy feature that is related to the change in female schooling is the rise in household saving
rates in recent decades. The reason is that Chinese parents are used to relying heavily on children, especially
sons, for providing old-age care of themselves. The convention contributes a close connection between the
rate of return on physical capital and on human capital. [Figure 2.4] presents the gross household saving rates
from Flow of Funds Accounts in the China Statistical Yearbook (CSY, 2012) and from World Development
Indicators (WDI) in the upper panel as well as household saving rates by using the data from China Urban
and Rural Household Survey in the lower panel. Note that, though there exist some discrepancies between
dierent measures, the household saving rates are continuously increasing after 1990. 8 Moreover, the series
6See the denition by http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/stats_popup5.html
7Chen and Hamori (2009) have similar ndings by using CHNS data of years 2004-2006 after controlling potential selection
bias.
8The discrepancies occur perhaps due to dierences on the denition of saving rates to be used. For example, household
saving rates in urban and rural sectors are computed by (1 - Annual Per Capita Consumption Expenditure/Annual Per Capita
Disposable Income)*100% and (1 - Annual Per Capita Net Income/Annual Per Capita Living Expenditure)*100%, respectively.
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of saving rates of urban households displays a signicantly upward pattern whereas rural-household savings
uctuate a lot over time.
2.2.2 Implications and evidence from CHIP household surveys
[Table 2.2] summarizes the most and second-most important purposes of saving for rural households
from a survey data in the CHIP-2002. This survey question has been studied by Wei and Zhang (2011),
but the motive to save that we put emphasis here is preparing for elderly life after retirement. We begin by
comparing three-person households, and they are mostly have a single daughter or son. There are 46 percent
of the households with a single daughter that choose preparing for retirement as an important incentive to
save, in contrast to 37% of the households with the only son. A similar result is also observed in samples
of four-person households since the percentage of saving for retirement is decreasing in the number of sons,
from 46% to 23%. In addition, households with one or two daughters are more likely to rank preparing
for sickness as their main concern, because the ratio is 6-7% relatively higher than the counterparts with
the same number of sons. The results conrm our primary conjecture that gender of the child should be
considered regarding the motives to save. The statistics also suggests that sons are expected to provide
nancial supports to retired parents more than daughters.9
In addition to the information regarding the motives to save, the CHIP-2002 survey also provides sug-
gestive evidence to validate our argument that the fertility constraint due to the OCP has inuence on
household's gender-based education decisions. [Table 2.3] outlines the composition of households in urban
and rural areas. Nearly 70% of Households in urban area are classied into the 3-persons category, and they
are mostly composed of two parents and one child. Another 7.9% of households have multiple children, and
9One of possible conjectures to explain this signicant dierence is existence of patrilocality, or the custom of residence with
husband's relatives. [Figure 2.5] depicts main reasons to migration by gender from the China Population Census 2005, and it
is observed that females are more likely to migrate for marriage and the ratio is about 10% higher than males.
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the number of children for most of households is not greater than two. Meanwhile, it is observed that fertility
constraint is less restrictive in rural areas since 54.5% of households have 2 children or more. The comparison
between households' decisions in urban and rural area is informative because it is used to understand the
changes of households' concern under dierent tightness of fertility constraint in some sense.
In [Table 2.4], all of the individuals in the CHIP-2002 with identity \child" and ages between 16 to 22 are
sorted in terms of divisions by region, gender, and the size of households that they were born. We select the
samples only from children at age 16{22 because they are supposed to study senior high school (or above)
at that time. Ratios of non-schooling with respect to each division are correspondingly tabulated. The ratio
is dened by the fraction of children who are not currently full-time students and it is used to capture the
aggregate enrollment/non-enrollment ratio of female to male students on a comparable basis. Note that we
abstract from the potential issue of sibling composition eect and focus on the eect of number of children
on schooling decisions, which will be highlighted in our model.
The table shows that the rate of non-schooling for both male and female children is increasing in the
number of children that each household has. For example, there are 60.7% female and 60.4% male children
at age 16{22 under non-schooling status from households with a single child in rural area, and the rates
respectively increase by 14.3% and 9.3% for those who were born in households with more than 3 children.
In contrast, the non-schooling rate of female children in urban area does not have a relative increase with
the rise of number of children compared to the rate of males. The change of values may justify our suspect
that females are likely to obtain educational resources under tighter fertility constraint.10
10Note that Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2008) also document the similar ndings by using 1% sample of China Population Census
1999. Similar to our observations based on CHIP-2002, their study shows that female children, in terms of dierent family
sizes, consistently have lower rate of receiving secondary education and above than males in rural area, but the dierences are
not observed simultaneously in urban area.
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2.3 The Model
The dynamics of population Time is discrete and goes to innite, t = 0; 1; 2;    . The economy is
populated by agents who live for 3 periods. In addition, each age cohort is evenly distributed by male and
female agents. We denote the state of age structure at the beginning of time t as (Lt 2; Lt 1), where Lt k is
the number of male (female) agents who were born at the beginning of period t k, k = 1; 2. For convenience,
we call the people who were born at period t  1 the young generation at time t, and the people who were
born at period t  2 the old generation at time t. In addition, individuals who were born during period t are
called the newborn at time t.
In each period, each male agent in the young generation marries a female agent in the same generation.
Couples married at time t become time-t representative households. We model the fertility decision of the
representative household as a reproduction rate nt 2 [0; n], n < 1. Note that n represents a population
control policy imposed by the government. If the government does not impose any restrictions on reproduc-
tion, we set n = nb, where nb is the biological limit of reproduction. At the end of each period, the newborn
turns into the young generation, the young turn into old, and the old generation dies. Hence, the number of
the young-generation agents evolves according to
Lt = ntLt 1: (2.1)
We say that the population is along the balanced growth path if nt = n is constant over time. In such case,
Lt = L0n
t; (2.2)
for some n  0.
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Production technologies There is a nal output Yt that requires physical and human capital as inputs
and can be consumed by households or turned into investment. We denote Kt to be the stock of physical
capital at time t, and hi;t to be the stock of human capital for male and female agents at time t, where i = m
for male agents and i = f for females.
We make an usual assumption about the law of motion for physical capital:
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It; (2.3)
where  is the depreciation rate for physical capital, and It investment at time t.
For human capital, we assume that a young agent's human capital is measured by the amount of schooling.
A male agent provides hm;t
 ecient units of labor when they are young, and a female agent provides
(1  b(nt))zhf;t ecient units of labor, where z > 0 measures the gender productivity dierence between a
woman with no children and a man given that they have the same level of education. We also assume that
reproduction reduces a female's human capital, therefore b0(nt) > 0. This assumption is to capture that
wives specialize in reproduction activities. We also assume that b(nb) < 1, so that female productivity is
non-negative within their fertility limit.
The production of nal goods is constant return to scale, with a constant labor-augmented technology
growth rate g. That is,
Yt = F (Kt; g
tHt); (2.4)
where the supply of human capital into production of consumption goods is
Ht = Lt 1 (hm;t + (1  b(nt))zhf;t)  Lt (hm;t+1 + hf;t+1) : (2.5)
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That is, the total amount of schooling demand is Lt (hm;t+1 + hf;t+1), each unit of schooling requires  units
of ecient labor, and the rest of labor will be put into production of nal goods.
Feasible allocations and aggregate state transitions The aggregate state at the beginning of time t
is (Lt 2; Lt 1;Kt; hm;t; hf;t): A resource allocation at time t is a consumption plan for the young generation
and the old, (cyt ; c
o
t ), investment It, reproduction nt, and education for the next generation (hm;t+1; hf;t+1).
For a closed economy, given initial state (L 2; L 1;K0; hm;0; hf;0), we say a sequence of allocations
fcyt ; cot ; It; nt; hm;t+1; hf;t+1g1t=0 is feasible if given the allocations, the transition of aggregate state
(Lt 2; Lt 1;Kt; hm;t; hf;t)
cyt ;c
o
t ;It;;nt;hm;t+1;hf;t+1                ! (Lt 1; Lt;Kt+1; hm;t+1; hf;t+1); (2.6)
evolves according to equations (2.1), (2.3), and (2.5), and the allocations satisfy the feasibility constraint
Yt  cotLt 2 + cytLt 1 + It (2.7)
for t = 0; 1;    .
Preferences and parental altruism We assume that the preference of a time-T household is dened
over allocations fcyt ; cot ; nt; hm;t+1; hf;t+1g1t=T . Note that the history of allocations and the physical capital
investment in the current period do not directly aect household preference. We denote cT = (cyT ; c
o
T+1)
be the consumption path over the life cycle of the time-T household, and hT = (hm;T+1; hf;T+1) be the
education level that the time-T household chooses for their children. We say that the household is non-
altruistic if their preference only depends on (cT;hT). We say that the household exhibits parental altruism
if their preference also depends on (ct;ht) for t > T . As we shall see clear in the following, what really
distinguishes these two types of preferences is that in a decentralized economy, a household who has parental
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altruism cares about the actions taken by future generations, while a non-altruistic household concerns only
actions taken by themselves.
Since one of the main object of the dynamic setting is to explore parental altruistic behavior, we simplify
the analysis by assuming that households care about their children's education to the extent which it aects
future generations' welfare. That is, a time-T household's utility function is dened over fctg1t=T . We further
assume that U(fctg1t=T ) is homogeneous of degree 1   and additively separable, and  (nt) is the weight
of parental altruism toward each child.11
Assumption 1.
U(fctg1t=T ) = u(cT) +
1X
t=T
 
tY
t0=T
nt0 (nt0)
!
u(ct+1); (2.8)
where  (n) is a decreasing function of n, n (n) < 1 for all n  nb, and
u(ct) =
(cyt )
1 
1   + 
(cot+1)
1 
1   ; (2.9)
for 0 <  < 1 and  > 0.
Decentralized markets We want to solve the allocation over time in a decentralized economy. Assume
that agents before adulthood have no access to capital markets and need their parents to provide their
education expenses. Production technologies are run by competitive rms, who hire labor and rent capital
from households. Denote rt to be the interest rate and g
twt to be the wage rate per ecient unit of labor.
Assume that the goods market is fully competitive. Dene kt =
Kt
Ht
to be the physical-human capital ratio.
The interest rate at time-t is pinned down by the marginal product of physical capital at time-t + 1 less
11See the setting by Becker et al. (1990).
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depreciation,
rt = F1(g
 t 1kt+1; 1)  ; (2.10)
and the wage rate at time-t is pinned down by the marginal product of human capital at time-t; therefore,
wt = F2(g
 tkt; 1): (2.11)
Patrilocality and savings for old-age security We assume that postmarital residence to be patrilocal,
which means that a married couple lives with or near to the husband's parents. Eectively, we assume that
female adults cannot support her parents, while male adults are obliged by social norms.We also assume
that the economy is dictated by a social norm that male adults should support their parents' consumption
after retirement with a fraction  of the male's earnings. Therefore, the consumption of a young generation
household at time-t is determined by household income subtracting nancial transfers, education expenses,
and savings
cyt = g
twt [(1  )hm;t + (1  b(nt))zhf;t   nt(hm;t+1 + hf;t+1)]  at: (2.12)
Household saves for their old-age security, which is partially supported by their adult sons. Therefore,
cot+1 = (1 + rt)at + ntg
t+1wt+1hm;t+1
 : (2.13)
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We can combine the above expressions to derive the life-time budget constraint of a time-t young household.
That is,
cyt +
cot+1
1 + rt
= gtwt [(1  )hm;t + (1  b(nt))zhf;t   nt(hm;t+1 + hf;t+1)] + ntg
t+1wt+1hm;t+1

1 + rt
:
(2.14)
Also note that all physical capital is held by the old generation, and therefore we have
Kt = at 1Lt 2; (2.15)
for t = 0; 1;    .
Household decision problem Under Assumption 1, the household cares about the welfare of future
generations, and it could aect the decisions of their ospring by providing education to their children. An-
ticipating that their ospring will allocate resources optimally by their preferences, the household's decision
problem can be formulated recursively as follows.
Vt(hm;t; hf;t) = max
cyt ;c
o
t+1;hm;t+1;hf;t+1;nt
(cyt )
1 
1   + 
(cot+1)
1 
1   + nt (nt)Vt+1(hm;t+1; hf;t+1) (2.16)
subject to the life-time budget constraint
cyt +
cot+1
1 + rt
= gtwt [(1  )hm;t + (1  b(nt))zhf;t   nt(hm;t+1 + hf;t+1)] + ntg
t+1wt+1hm;t+1

1 + rt
(2.17)
given that nt  n. Note that
gtwt [(1  )hm;t + (1  b(nt))zhf;t ] (2.18)
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is the household wage income minus the transfer to the parents,
gtwtnt(hm;t+1 + hf;t+1) (2.19)
is the education expenditure on their children, and
ntg
t+1wt+1hm;t+1

1 + rt
(2.20)
is the discounted value of old-age nancial support from their male children.
Based on the rst order conditions, we have
nt (nt)
gt+1wt+1(1  )hm;t+1 1
(cyt+1)

+
nt
(cyt )

gt+1wt+1hm;t+1
 1
1 + rt
=
nt
(cyt )

gtwt; (2.21)
nt (nt)
gt+1wt+1(1  b(nt+1))zhf;t+1 1
(cyt+1)

=
nt
(cyt )

gtwt; (2.22)
and
Vt+1(hm;t+1; hf;t+1) 
gtwt [(hm;t+1 + hf;t+1) + b
0(nt)zhf;t ]  g
t+1wt+1hm;t+1

1+rt
( (nt) + nt 0(nt)) (c
y
t )

; (2.23)
with equality holds if nt < n:
The rst-order conditions of consumption imply
cyt =
1
1 + 
1
 (1 + rt)
1
 1
Ct; (2.24)
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and
cot+1 =

1
 (1 + rt)
1
 1
1 + 
1
 (1 + rt)
1
 1
(1 + rt)Ct; (2.25)
where Ct is the present value of the expenditures on consumption; namely,
Ct = g
twt [(1  )hm;t + (1  b(nt))zhf;t   nt(hm;t+1 + hf;t+1)] + ntg
t+1wt+1hm;t+1

1 + rt
: (2.26)
The household asset holdings can be derived based on equation (2.13)
at =
cot+1
1 + rt
  ntg
t+1wt+1hm;t+1

1 + rt
: (2.27)
Denition of competitive equilibrium Given an initial state (L 2; L 1; a 1; hm;0; hf;0), a competitive
equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fcyt ; cot ; at; nt; hm;t+1; hf;t+1g1t=0 and prices fgtwt; rt 1g1t=0 such that
i) Given fgtwt; rt 1g1t=0, fcyt ; cot+1; at; nt; hm;t+1; hf;t+1g1t=0 satises equations (2.21)-(2.25) and (2.27), given
co0 = (1 + r 1)a 1 + 
L 1
L 2
w0hm;0
 ; (2.28)
ii) Population Lt evolves according to equation (2.1), aggregate physical capital Kt evolves according to
equation (2.3), and aggregate human capital in production Ht evolves according to equation (2.5);
iii) Prices fgtwt; rt 1g1t=0 evolves according to the conditions (2.10) and (2.11).
Education levels on the balanced growth path Assume that the economy is on its balanced growth
path and that rt = r, wt = w. Assume that household's fertility and education choices are constant over
time. That is,
hm;t+1 = hm
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hf;t+1 = hf
nt = n:
The following lemma can be proven by standard arguments.
Lemma 1. Vt(hm; hf ) = g
(1 )tV0(hm; hf ).
Notice that from equation (2.23) on the balanced growth path the fertility decision satises
( (n) + n 0(n)) g(1 )
h
(cy0)
1 
1  + 
(co1)
1 
1 
i
1  n (n)g1  
w
(cy0)


(hm + hf ) + b
0(n)zhf    ghm

1 + r

; (2.29)
and a population control policy is strictly binding if the above condition holds with strictly inequality with
n = n. Based on equations (2.21) and (2.22), we know that on the balanced growth path,
 =

(1  ) (n)g1  +  g
1 + r

hm
 1; (2.30)
and
 = (1  b(n))z (n)g1 hf  1: (2.31)
Note that both of the (1   b(n)) (females' labor supply) and the  (n)n (parental altruism) decrease as n
increases. This implies a larger hf as the binding population control policy restricted n a smaller number.
Moreover, from equation (2.30) we also see that hm increases as n decreases. Moreover, we know that the
ratio of rate of return on education
(1  )hm 1
(1  b(n))zhf  1
= 1  ghm;t
 1
(1 + r)
(2.32)
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becomes closer to 1 as n decreases. Also,

hf
hm
1 
=

1  ghm
 1
(1 + r)

(1  b(n))z
1   ; (2.33)
which implies that
hf
hm
increases as n decreases, and hf > hm if

1  ghm
 1
(1 + r)

(1  b(n))z
1   > 1: (2.34)
Equation (2.33) delivers another intergenerational incentive for altruistic parents since an additional channel
takes eect via the term (1 b(n))z1  . The underlying reason is that education level of daughters is weighed
more as they are expected to have fewer children since parents care about the discounted value of their
children. Put dierently, females will spend more time participating in the labor market when they have
fewer children, making daughters' human capital more valuable and their parents' investments worthwhile.
As a result, altruistic parents will endogenously adjust toward female schooling. Note also there is no wealth
eect for n on the balanced growth path because the marginal rate of substitution between generations
remains constant.
Saving rates on the balanced growth path Since
cy0
co0
is pinned down by
u1;t
u2;t
= (1 + r), we have
cyt = (r)C0; (2.35)
cot = (1 + r)(1  (r))C0; (2.36)
where C0 is the present value of lifetime consumption expenditure,
C0 = w0 [(1  )hm + (1  b(n))zhf    n(hm + hf )] + ngw0hm

1+r ;
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and
(r) =
1
1 + 
1
 (1 + r)
1
 1
: (2.37)
The asset holdings of the young generation are
at = (1  (r))C0   nwt+1hm

1 + r
; (2.38)
and the corresponding saving rate is
syt =
at
Wt
; (2.39)
where Wt = wt[(1  )hm + (1  b(n))zhf  ] is the wage income of the young generation.
The old generation has dividend income rat 1, and sells all nancial assets. Therefore the saving rate of
the old is
sot =
 (1 + r)at 1
rat 1
=
 (1 + r)
r
: (2.40)
The aggregate savings is a weighted average of the age-specic saving rates,
st = ts
y
t + (1  t)sot ; (2.41)
where
t =
Lt 1Wt
Lt 1Wt + Lt 2rat 1
; (2.42)
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and is constant over time on the BGP. In particular, on the BGP syt = s
y, and
st = s = s
y + (1  ) (1 + r)
r
; (2.43)
where
 =
g
g + rns
y
: (2.44)
We summarize the eects of the population control policy on aggregate saving rate via the following channels
 (Income eect) n aects sy since fewer children implies
{ fewer children to provide education;
{ higher household wage income;
{ fewer children to support old-age security. These factors tend to increase sy;
but
{ more education for each children. This factor reduces sy.
 (Ageing population eect) n aects  since
{ lower n produces an aging population, and the old generation dissaves;
{ lower n changes sy, therefore change the relative wealth between the old and the young generation.
When ds
y
n < 0, both eects tend to reduce  when n is smaller.
We calibrate our model to evaluate the net eect of OCP on saving rate and on the children's education.
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Physical-human capital ratio and the general equilibrium eects To nd the general equilibrium
eect, we next solve the equilibrium interest rate and wage as functions of physical-human capital ratio k,
and solve k via the market clearing condition. Assume that the aggregate production function is F (Kt;Ht) =
A0K

t H
1 
t . Based on the equations (2.10) and (2.11), we have
Kt
Ht
= kgt; (2.45)
w = (1  )A0k; (2.46)
r = A0k
 1   ; (2.47)
where k = K0H0 . Normalize L 2 = 1. Then K0 = a 1 = a0=g. Market clearing on the balanced growth path
implies that Y0 = c
o
0L 2 + c
y
0L 1 +K1   (1  )K0. Therefore, k is pinned down by
A0
a0
g
k 1 =
co1
g
+ cy0n+ a0n  (1  )
a0
g
; (2.48)
where n, a0, c
o
1, c
y
0 are functions of k.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
We calibrate our model to t the main features of China's economy and quantify the eects of the
implementation of the \One-Child" policy on main variables of interest by comparing their changes under
the two policy regimes.
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2.4.1 Calibration
Our calibration strategy is rstly to characterize the features of China's economy at two steady states
(balanced growth paths): one with endogenous fertility rate and the other with exogenously constrained
fertility rate under the population control policy. We set the model period to be 20 years and adjust related
variables consistent with the setting. Parameters in the model are hence calibrated to t the moments: (i)
unconstrained fertility rate, (ii) inequality of years of schooling, (iii) household saving rate, and (iv) share of
household's education expenditure. Information regarding the parameters to be calibrated and the source of
reference is summarized in [Table 2.5]. The policy eect is then evaluated through the release of the fertility
constraint. Secondly, the dynamics of population, physical, and human capital is included to generate the
transitions of variables.
The parameters are selected or calibrated based on the following source of reference. The parameters
related to the production function are (; )0, in which capital share and depreciation rate are set to  = 0:5
and  = 0:88 to be consistent with values documented by Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006). The depreciation rate
in the 20-year horizon is computed based on the annual rate at 10%; namely, 0:88 = 1  (1  0:1)20. Annual
growth rate of TFP equal to 2.3% at constant national price level is calculated by using data of Penn World
Table and the number gives us g = (1 + 0:023)20   1 = 0:58.
The male's rate of return on schooling around year 1995,  = 0:057; is chosen based on the estimates
provided by Zheng et al. (2005). The gender gap on the rate of return to education, z = 1:18, is calibrated to
match the computed index hf=fm = 0:87 at the initial steady state. Following Bar and Leukhina (2010), we
set the cost of raising children as a deduction from female's hours of working in the form of b(n) = b0n, and the
value of b0 = 0:129 is calibrated so that it matches the estimated eect on women's labor force participation
77
by Maurer-Fazio et al. (2011). Proportion of nancial transfer to pre-transfer income ( = 0:15) is obtained
from the statistics sorted by Lei et al. (2012, pp.214).12 Finally, the unit price of education relative to
consumption goods,  = 0:01, is calibrated to match the share of rural household education expenditure on
7.35% in year 1995 documented by CSY.
In addition, the parental altruistic preference is represented by an increasing function of n, i.e.,  (n) =
n1  , and this setting conforms our assumption  (n) >  0(n)n. The parameter governing the elasticity of
parental altruism,  = 0:5, follows the value chosen by Liao (2013) while the other parameter  = 0:383 is
calibrated to match the fertility rate 2.71 in year 1980. The objective discounted rate  = 0:404 is computed
by using the annual rate 0.95 since 0:404 = (0:95)20. The remaining preference parameters is the inverse of
the elasticity substitution,  = 0:91, is calibrated so that the initial household saving rate equals 26%, which
is the same with the value provided by Banerjee et al. (2014).
It shows that the variables subject to the second steady-state value of fertility n = 1:60: saving rate
equal to 26.8%, and relative female ratio hf=hm equal to 1.05. This result, to some extent, delivers the
simultaneously increases of household saving rate and female student ratio under OCP, as depicted in [Figure
2.1] and [Figure 2.3].
2.4.2 The role of the fertility constraint on the transition
2.5 Conclusion
One of the striking structural changes of developing economies is the reduction of population's birth rates,
and many countries have tried various population control policies as an instrument to promote economic
development. In this chapter, we propose an overlapping generation model to analyze the eect of a binding
population control policy on physical and human capital accumulation via household's saving and schooling
12They use pilot of CHARLS of year 2008 and focus on provinces of Zhejiang and Gansu of China.
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decisions. The model will be calibrated to explain the rapid growth of saving rate and schooling years in
China after its implementation of the \One-Child Policy."
We emphasize gender dierence in lial support and childcare for two reasons. Firstly, the role of women
in economic activities, in particular their education level and labor supply, is crucial to promote economic
development in low-income and developing countries. It is therefore important to understand how gender
dierence within family aects women's productivity. Secondly, vast empirical evidence suggests that in
a patrilocal society such as China, there exists gender dierence in lial support and childcare; namely,
men have more responsibility in supporting their parents and women in childcare. Therefore, incorporating
gender dierence helps explain household saving decision and parental investment in education.
In addition, this chapter is among a few studies to consider the general equilibrium eects of a population
control policy. Unlike previous studies, however, we argue that the need for a household to save does not
oset by the slowdown of population growth. In our model, higher levels of human capital compensate lower
fertility, and hence the interest rate does not drop under population control. Therefore, household savings
increase with a tighter population control policy.
So far, we focus on the eects of a population control policy on the balanced growth path. For the case
of China under the \One-Child Policy," we are able to explain the co-movement of household saving and
the gender dierence regarding schooling years. Our future work is to see how our model can explain the
transition of savings and schooling after the implementation of China's population control policy.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of female student in secondary education (measured by total enrolled and new entrant)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
10
20
30
40
50
60
year
%
Entrance rate on senior high school (entrants of senior high school/graduates of junior high school)
 
 
Y15
male
female
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
year
in
de
x
Index of relative educational opportunity on senior high school education (female)
Y15
Figure 2.2: Entrance rate of male and female students and the GPI
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Figure 2.3: The rate of return on schooling estimated by Zhang et al. (2005)
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Figure 2.4: Household saving rate of China by dierent measure
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Figure 2.5: Reasons to migration by China Population Census 2005 (1% samples)
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Table 2.1: Change of gender parity across countries and regions in tertiary education*
Country/Region Change of GPI** Change rate of gross Sample year
enrollment ratio
(female over male)
China 0.56 2.35 1994{2010
Cambodia 0.41 3.57 1995{2010
India 0.15 1.40 1995{2010
Indonesia 0.24 1.80 1995{2010
Japan 0.07 1.31 1995{2010
Asia
9
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
;
Korea (The Repulic of) 0.16 1.60 1995{2010
Countries Lao 0.36 2.02 1995{2010
Malaysia 0.16 1.40 1998{2010
Mongolia -0.74 0.58 1995{2010
Myanmar -0.23 0.78 1995{2010
Philippines -0.14 -0.20 1995{2009
Thailand 0.14 1.21 1993{2010
East Asia and the Pacic countries 0 1.00 1995{2010
Low income countries 0.13 1.46 1995{2010
Middle income countries 0.20 1.43 1995{2010
High income countries 0.16 1.59 1995{2010
All developing countries 0.24 1.58 1995{2010
World 0.13 1.30 1995{2010
*Source: UNESCO
**The GPI is measured by GER of females relative to males, i.e., FGER/MGER, and hence the changes of GPI
are computed by GPI2010 - GPI1995. On the other hand, the relative change rates of GER are computed by
FGER2010 FGER1995
FGER1995
=MGER2010 MGER1995
MGER1995
.
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Table 2.2: The main motives to saving from survey of rural households by CHIP-2002
Family type
1st (2nd) motive of saving 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
for children's education 18.5 (8.6) 47.9 (10.6) 41.2 (7.7) 52.5 (12.5) 54.7 (8.4) 50.5 (9.5) 47.0 (8.9)
for the children's wedding 6.8 (9.5) 6.6 (15.6) 17.3 (19.6) 10.1 (17.3) 14.6 (26.8) 19.4 (28.8) 14.2 (21.6)
for parental bequest 3.6 (12.3) 3.2 (9.5) 3.9 (12.2) 1.8 (9.3) 2.0 (9.2) 1.8 (6.3) 2.9 (10.0)
for elderly life 50.0 (17.3) 28.0 (25.6) 23.7 (26.8) 23.3 (30.1) 15.4 (20.8) 13.6 (19.9) 21.9 (23.9)
for future sickness 9.5 (25.9) 4.1 (14.5) 3.9 (11.2) 3.9 (12.5) 2.3 (9.1) 3.6 (8.7) 3.7 (11.5)
for building a house 5.0 (5.9) 6.6 (10.0) 6.7 (10.5) 6.9 (9.9) 8.2 (13.5) 8.4 (13.5) 7.3 (11.4)
for other reasons 8.2 (20.5) 3.5 (14.1) 3.2 (11.9) 1.5 (8.4) 2.8 (12.2) 2.6 (13.3) 3.2 (12.6)
* There are 9200 rural households under investigation by CHIP 2002. We only consider 3-persons and 4-persons, and hence
totally 5286 households. They are then divided into 6 groups, in which type 1 to type 5 respectively represent "3-persons
family with only one daughter," "3-persons family with only one son," "4-persons family with two daughters," "4-persons
family with one son and one daughter," "4-persons family with two sons." Additionally, households with other combinations
of members are denoted by type 0.
Table 2.3: Rate of non-schooling in age 16{22 children by region, gender, and family type
ratio (number of obs.) Urban Rural
female male female male
1-child 22.6% (730) 22.5% (746) 60.7% (270) 60.4% (568)
2-child 33.1% (163) 33.6% (149) 62.7% (1170) 60.8% (1383)
3-child - - 71.2% (764) 63.6% (698)
> 3-child - - 75.0% (452) 69.7% (323)
total 25.0% (908) 24.6% (904) 67.1% (2656) 62.3% (2972)
The data is from the same source as stated in [Table 2.3]. Individuals whose relation
with household heads are \child" and ages between 16{22 are selected. Their current
education status is analyzed by gender and by area. The ratios and numbers in each
block represent the rate of non-schooling and number of observations from individuals
in each division. The statistics of urban part is limited on individuals from 1-child
and 2-child households since the remaining observations only account for a small and
negligible proportion.
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Table 2.4: Summary of parameters to be calibrated
Parameter Value Source Category / Target
n 1.610 WDI constrained fertility rate under OCP (fertility rate in 1980)
g 0.576 PWT 8.0 growth rate of TFP of China (2.3% annual rate)
 0.404 standard subjective discount factor (0.95 annually)
 0.5 Liao (2013) parameter of parental altruism
 0.38 calibrated parameter of parental altruism
 0.15 Lei et al. (2012) nancial transfers from sons to parents
 0.916 calibrated inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
 0.010 calibrated price of each unit of education good
 0.057 Zhang et al. (2005) male's rate of return on years of schooling
z 1.178 calibrated female's premium on the rate of retun to education
b0 0.129 calibrated parental time spent on each child
 0.50 Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) capital share of the production function
 0.88 Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) depreciation rate of capital (10% annual rate)
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2.7 Appendix: numerical solutions
In this appendix, we rst describe how variables along the two steady-state paths are solved. Then, a
computation scheme to solving transition periods is provided by using a simple case.
2.7.1 Solving the steady state
The steady state at t = 0 is solved by
 =

(1  ) (n)g1  +  g
1 + r

hm
 1; (A.2.1)
 = (1  b(n))z (n)g1 hf  1; (A.2.2)
g1 u(cy0; c
o
1)
w0u1;0
 0(n)
(1  g1  (n))  (hm + hf ) + b
0(n)zhf    ghm

1 + r
; (A.2.3)
and the strick inequality of eq. (3) holds as n = n. The rst order conditions on consumption give
cy0 =
1
1 + 
1
 (1 + r)
1
 1
C0; (A.2.4)
co1 =

1
 (1 + r)
1
 1
1 + 
1
 (1 + r)
1
 1
(1 + r)C0; (A.2.5)
in which
C0 = w0

[(1  )hm + (1  b(n))zhf    n(hm + hf )] + nghm

1 + r

;
is growing at a constant rate g. The prices of physical and human capitals are determined by
r = A0k
 1   ; (A.2.6)
w = (1  )A0k; (A.2.7)
88
The market clear conditions are written as
A0
a0
g
k 1 =
co1
g
+ cy0n+ a0n  (1  )
a0
g
; (A.2.8)
where the initial value of capital is given by
K0 = a0=g (A.2.9)
Set the functional form of b(n) = b0n and  (n) = n
1  , in which 0 <   1. The asset holdings of the
young cohort
at =


1
 (1 + r)
1
 1
1 + 
1
 (1 + r)
1
 1

Ct   nwt+1hm

1 + r
;
which implies at the initial steady state
a0 =


1
 (1 + r)
1
 1
1 + 
1
 (1 + r)
1
 1

C0   n(gw0)hm

1 + r
: (A.2.10)
Hence, the saving rate of the young cohort at t = 0 is dened as the ratio of the asset holdings to the wage
income
s0 =
a0
w0[(1  )hm + (1  b(n))zhf  ] : (A.2.11)
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Table 2.5: Settings of the timeline (OCP imposed at t)
(hm, hf , n) -1 ... t ... T   1 T
Parents (hm
, hf) (hm, hf) (hm;T 1, hf;T 1) (hm, hf )
Children (hm
, hf) (hm;t, hf;t) (hm, hf ) (hm, hf )
Fertility n n n n
2.7.2 Computation scheme at the transition economy
Refer to the timeline displayed in [Table 2.5] and assume that the economy is on its balanced growth
path at t =  1 with its initial steady-state values of (L 2; L 1;K0; hm;0; hf;0) = (1; nL 2;K0; hm; hf ) and
now the policy that restricted nt = n is imposed at t = 0.
We now consider a simple 4-period case by setting T = 2 and list all of equations that characterize the
transition from t = 0 to t = 2. We solve the sequence of allocations fcyt ; cot ; at; nt; hm;t+1; hf;t+1g1t=0 and
prices fwt; rt 1g1t=0 as well as the aggregates fK1;K2g and fH0, H1g in order to pin down the prices and
the dynamics of population L given the initial value L 2 = 1.
First, we use the equations in Section 2.6.1 to determine variables at the two steady states (balanced
growth); namely, (1; n;K; hm; h

f ) for nt = n
 at t = 0 and (1; n; K; hm; hf ) for nt = n at t = 2.
The rm's optimization conditions at t = 0 are
w0 = (1  )A0(K0
H0
); (A.2.12)
r 1 = A0(
K0
H0
) 1    (A.2.13)
where the initial K0 is given. The aggregate human capital is
H0 = L 1
n
(hm
) + (1  b(n0))z(hf )   n0(hm;1 + hf;1)
o
; (A.2.14)
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in which the population of middle-aged is
L 1 = n (A.2.15)
and
L 2 = 1: (A.2.16)
Old generation's consumption at t = 0 is determined by
co0 = (1 + r 1)
K0
L 2
+ nw0(hm) : (A.2.17)
Young generation's consumption and asset holdings at t = 0 are
cy0 =
1
1 + 
1
 (1 + r0)
1
 1

w0 [(1  )(hm) + (1  b(n0))z(hf )   n0(hm;1 + hf;1)]
+
n0gw1(hm;1)

1 + r0

; (A.2.18)
and
a0 = w0 [(1  )(hm) + (1  b(n0))z(hf )   n0(hm;1 + hf;1)]  cy0: (A.2.19)
Under the population control policy, the fertility rate is xed at
n0 = n: (A.2.20)
The allocation of (hm;1; hf;1) is derived by
n0
1  

gw1(1  )(hm;1) 1
(cy1)


+
n0
(cy0)


gw1(hm;1)
 1
1 + r0

=
n0
(cy0)

w0; (A.2.21)
n0
1  

gw1(1  b(n1))z(hf;1) 1
(cy1)


=
n0
(cy0)

w0; (A.2.22)
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Note that the equations (A.2.17)-(A.2.22) also depend on the variables to be determined at t = 1; they are
w1; r0; c
y
1; n1 to be solved jointly by the following equations.
At t = 1, these variables are chosen such that the new balanced growth path is reached at t = 2. The
rm's optimization conditions given that T = 2 are
wT 1 = (1  )A0(gT 1) (KT 1
HT 1
); (A.2.23)
rT 2 = A0(gT 1)1 (
KT 1
HT 1
) 1   : (A.2.24)
The supply of physical capital is from the assets held by the old-aged cohort at T   1, i.e.,
KT 1 = LT 3aT 2 = LT 3
n
gT 2wT 2 [(1  )(hm) + (1  b(nT 2))z(hf )   nT 2(hm;T 1 + hf;T 1)] cyT 2
o
:
(A.2.25)
The aggregate human capital is
HT 1 = LT 2
n
(hm;T 1) + (1  b(nT 1))z(hf;T 1)   nT 1(hm;T + hf;T )
o
; (A.2.26)
where
LT 2 = nn: (A.2.27)
Old generation's consumption at t = T   1 is determined by
coT 1 = (1 + rT 2)aT 2 + nT 2g
T 1wT 1(hm;T 1) : (A.2.28)
Young generation's consumption at t = T   1 is
cyT 1 = g
T 1wT 1[(1  )(hm;T 1) + (1  b(nT 1))z(hf;T 1)   nT 1(hm;T + hf; T )]  aT 1 (A.2.29)
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so that savings and education can match the state at t = T
aT 1 =
KT
LT 2
: (A.2.30)
The constrained fertility rate, and the choices on human capital are
nT 1 = n; (A.2.31)
hm;T = hm; (A.2.32)
and
hf; T = hf : (A.2.33)
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